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INTRODUCTION
Private property is widely perceived as a potent prodevelopment
and anticonservationist force. The drive to accumulate wealth through
private property rights is thought to encourage environmentally de
structive development; legal protection of such property rights is be
lieved to thwart environmentally friendly public measures. Indeed,
property rights advocates and environmentalists are generally de
scribed as irreconcilable foes. This presumed clash often leads envi
ronmentalists to urge public acquisition of private lands.
Interestingly, less attention is paid to the possibility that the gov
ernment may prove no better a conservator than private owners. Gov
ernment actors often mismanage conservation properties, collaborat
ing with private developers to dispose of government property at
submarket prices and encouraging inefficient development on conser
vation property. The federal Bureau of Land Management, for in
stance, came under fire in a recent congressional report for its sale of
seventy acres of Nevada land to a private developer for $763,000; the
developer sold the land the next day for $4.6 million.'
The reasons for potential government mismanagement of conser
vation lands should be familiar to public choice theorists. First, gov
ernment decisionmakers are often influenced by the desire to extract
1. Joel Brinkley, A U.S. Agency Is Accused of Collusion in Land Deals, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2002, at A16.
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rents.2 Thus, decisionmakers may dispose of government properties at
submarket prices in order to obtain benefits for themselves in their
private capacities.3 Conservation lands are particularly vulnerable to
this phenomenon when they produce widely dispersed public benefits,
but, if developed, would produce smaller, highly localized benefits.4
Second, decisionmakers often fall prey to fiscal illusion, leading them
to fail to account for public benefits or costs that do not appear di
rectly in the government budget.5 Together, these factors lead to a
high likelihood that conservation properties will be mismanaged even
in government hands.
Our project in this Article is to design a new private property re
gime capable of providing optimal preservation incentives to both
market participants and political representatives.6
We begin with the observation that, notwithstanding the pressures
to develop conservation land, not every park or open space on valu
able land succumbs to such political pressures.7 Central Park in Man
hattan, for example, occupies some of the most valuable acreage in the
world.8 Yet, despite the enormous potential for commercial gains to
politically influential developers, there is very little chance that the
Park will be converted into luxury property. How does Central Park
fend off its potential predators, while other greenbelts so frequently
fall prey to the predations of urban development?9
2. See, e.g. , Richard E. Caves, Economic models of political choice: Canada's tariff
structure, 9 CAN J. ECON. 278 , 285-89 (197 6) (discussing evidence of rent-seeking in context
of tariff-setting); Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Legislatures as Unions, 8 6 J.
POL. ECON. 63, 65-71 (1978) (examining evidence that where legislators set their own com
pensation, they extract extraordinary extra-competitive salaries).
.

3. See infra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
4. See generally William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Political-Economy and the Case for a Met
ropolitan Green Space Initiative, 32 URB. LAW. 3 67, 373-74 (2000).
5. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
6. As we discuss in Part Ill, infra, our goal is to develop a regime that will protect com
mons whose ideal use has already been identified as conservation. We do not develop a
means for identifying such commons in this Article.
7. While the Article focuses on preservation of green space, the analysis and policy rec
ommendations apply with equal force to preservation of historic districts and other land
marks. Historic districts differ from the prototypical case described in this Article, insofar as
there may be persons with private property interests within the zone of the protected space.
That is, while ordinarily there will be no private property interests in a city park, for exam
ple, there will be numerous private property owners with stakes in a neighborhood with his
torically significant architecture. This fact does not, however, ultimately alter our analysis or
conclusions.
8. In addition to Central Park, many other parks - such as Grant Park in Chicago,
Fairmount Park in Philadelphia, and Golden Gate Park in San Francisco - have evaded
undesired development. We do not suggest, of course, that all development is undesirable, as
we discuss infra, in Parts III-IV.
9. The most famous historic example of undesirable development is the case of New
York City's Penn Station. The majestic station was destroyed to make room for Madison
Square Garden and the office building that sits atop the sports arena. This act not only de-
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The answer to this question, we posit, lies in an unrecognized but
potent hybrid of de facto public and de j ure property rights. Central
Park is surrounded by luxury properties whose owners enjoy the
amenities and views of the adjacent park.10 Formally, the Park is
owned by the public as open-access commons, and private owners
have no formal property interests in it. Nevertheless, owners of real
estate abutting the Park benefit in ways different than the general
public. For the abutting owners, the Park is a lustrous front yard, a
panoramic view, an acoustic barrier, and an air freshener. Adjacent
property owners thus possess a de facto quasi-property interest of con
siderable value. This unique interest transforms the owners of prop
erty in close proximity to the Park into the Park's "public guardians,"
and parlays into a political force in favor of conservation by providing
an incentive for these owners to protect the open space.11 While the de
facto easement is not absolute - abutting owners do not have veto
power over nongreen uses - in some cases it suffices to block harmful
development.12
Yet, at present, aside from extremely rare instances we discuss
later,13 the property interest can only be enforced through politics. Al
though this de facto interest displays the salient features of an ease
ment appurtenant - it is a nonpossessory interest that attaches to par
ticular parcels and runs with the land - the property owners have no
formal legal claim.14 Aggrieved adjacent property owners can only en-

strayed the station itself, it also destroyed the preexisting architectonic symmetry between
the station and the Post Office building across the street - a symmetry that may still be seen
in Philadelphia. The destruction of Penn Station prompted a massive public outcry and was
directly responsible for the enactment of the city's Preservation Ordinance. See John Nivala,
The Future for Our Past: Preserving Landmark Preservation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 89
(1996) ("New York City enacted its landmark preservation ordinance in direct response to a
single incident: the razing of Penn Station to permit construction of a new Madison Square
Garden.").
10. See Alison Beard, Global Investing: New York's Wealthy Apartment Hunters Are
Spoilt for Choice, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at 27, available at 2002 WL 23847024. After re
viewing approximately 30 empirical studies, a recent article suggested that for policy analy
sis, it should be assumed as a "point of departure" that parks have a positive impact of 20%
on property values abutting or fronting a passive park. John L. Crompton, The Impact of
Parks on Property Values: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 33 J. LEISURE RES. 1, 1
(2001). The Trust for Public Land, a nonprofit organization dedicated to conservation, esti
mated that Golden Gate Park in San Francisco "increases the value of nearby property by
an estimated $500 million to $1 billion, in the process generating $5-$10 million in annual
property taxes." See The Economic Benefits of Open Space, at http://www .openspacel .org/
OpenSpace/ISSUES/economicbenefitopenspace.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
1 1 . Indeed, the de facto interest produces a strong incentive for abutting homeowners to
invest in the upkeep of the park. See infra note 221 .
12. See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. Indeed, absent legislation formally recognizing such interests, courts might not rec
ognize them as valid easements. Under the traditional English rule, there are only four valid
types of negative easements: " [T]he right to stop your neighbor from (1) blocking your win-
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force their de facto interests by exerting their political influence; if
their political influence falls short of blocking undesired development,
as is often the case, the owners cannot assert any cognizable de jure
property interest in the park's preservation in court.15 As repeat play
ers in the political process without significant coordination costs, de
velopers generally have a leg up in the political arena.16
To remedy the political disparity, we propose to formalize the
neighbors' de facto interests into full-fledged property interests. Such
formalization would produce two desirable results. First, formal legal
recognition of the neighbors' interests would enable them to press
their anti-development claims in court. Second, and more importantly,
formalizing the neighbors' interests into formal negative easements
creates a new element in conservation of the threatened park: a net
work of antiproperty rights.
Antiproperty rights are veto rights over the use of an asset that are
granted to a large number of private actors - so large a number, in
fact, that due to holdout problems and transaction costs, it is highly
unlikely that they will ever voluntarily aggregate to alter use of the as
set. In our case, formalized negative easements (which we label anti
property easements) in the hands of neighbors are likely to produce a
regime in which it is practically impossible for unwanted development
to threaten conservation of the defended property.
Our proposal to formalize antiproperty easements gives rise to
several important insights - both practical and theoretical. First, and
counterintuitively, we show that increased transaction costs can be a
valuable policy response to market failures. The accepted lore among
law and economics scholars has been that when transaction costs are
positive, "the preferred legal rule is the rule that minimizes the effects
of transaction costs."17 We introduce a corollary: when transaction
costs may not be minimized by legal rules, the solution may be to con
sciously create additional transaction costs. Where transaction costs
systematically bias the market in favor of one outcome, and it is too
costly to eliminate the transaction costs, the best option for decision-

<lows, (2) interfering with air flowing to your land in a defined channel, (3) removing the
support of your building (usually by excavating or removing a supporting wall), and (4) in
terfering with the flow of water in an artificial stream." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 855-58 (5th ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted). In the main, this position has
been adopted in the United States, although "now and then a new type of negative easement
is recognized." Id. at 857.
15. See infra notes 115-129 and accompanying text. The importance - and relative fra
gility - of de facto political rights in promoting environmental protection has been noted
previously. See, e.g. , Jason Scott Johnston, On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 129, 139-41 (2002).
16. See generally, infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
17. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 13 (2d ed.
1989).
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makers may be to create countervailing transaction costs.18 The Article
thus points to a new way of resolving market flaws, applicable even
beyond the context of conservation.
Our second insight relates to the literature on private property and
commons. Existing theory recognizes three cardinal prototypes of
property regimes: public, commons, and private property.19 Public
property, as we have discussed, may be prone to mismanagement due
to political failure. Theorists have also identified a paradigmatic short
coming that plagues each of the latter two regimes: the tragedy of the
commons20 and the tragedy of the anticommons.21 The former plagues
commons property, leading to overexploitation of commons resources.
No one owner fully internalizes all of the costs associated with the
commons, so all users have an incentive to overuse. The tragedy of the
anticommons, conversely, is emblematic of private property regimes.
In an anticommons, "multiple owners are each endowed with the right
to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective
privilege of use."22 The result is that resources are underexploited. In
this Article, we herald the existence of a fourth prototype that avoids
the problems of mismanagement, overuse, and underexploitation: a
hybrid conservation commons that incorporates aspects of the three
pure regimes. We explain how the existence of a group of property
owners that receives positive externalities from an asset often eviscer
ates the ordinary concept of commons, creating in its place a hybrid
commons with elements of private property.23
18. Our proposal here may be seen as a proposal for a second-best outcome, in which
economics seeks the optimal result given the constraints of irresolvable market distortions,
as well as resource constraints. On second-best theory, see Karla Hoff, The Second Theorem
of the Second Best, 25 J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1994); R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The General
Theory of the Second-Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 1 (1 956).
19. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 37-42 (1988); cf
Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions About Property Rights and Environ
mental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 103 (1999) (arguing that all environ
mental problems must be solved within the framework of the traditional property trilogy).
But see Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 79 (2001) (arguing for a distinction between private and anticommons prop
erty, and for the inclusion of anticommons as a fourth type).
20. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
21. See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, The Tragedy of
the A nticommons].
22. Id. at 624.
23. Ellickson was the first to note that anticommons may be a useful policy tool when
the goal is non-use. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 n.22
(1993). Yet, he concluded that "(b]ecause anticommonses yield no profits, they are typically
owned by either governments or nonprofit organizations." Id. This conclusion ignores the
positive externalities that anticommons regimes can generate for private property owners.
We show that insofar as parks and open space are concerned, a properly tailored anticom
mons regime yields real benefits to adjacent property owners, as well as the public at large,
and is thus perfectly suitable for private ownership.
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Third, our analysis reveals a surprising symbiotic dynamic between
private development on the fringes of green space and environmental
conservation. Specifically, we show that public parks enhance the
value of private properties abutting them, which in turn creates abut
ting owners' stakes in park preservation.24 We harness this insight to
provide a new blueprint for conserving open spaces in areas expecting
aggressive and undesired development.
Fourth, and finally, we submit that formalizing antiproperty ease
ments adds a legal dimension to the already-present political right, and
creates the dynamic of Yes In My Back Yard ("YIMBY").25 The anti
property easement provides the inverse of a nuisance suit; where nui
sance allows proximate-property owners to counteract negative exter
nalities affecting the enjoyment of their property, enforcement actions
based on antiproperty easements can preserve positive externalities
benefiting their property. The antiproperty easement thus permits the
correction of inefficiencies created by externalities. Formalizing the
easement allows the courts to become an additional arena (in addition
to legislative, executive, and administrative bodies) in which abutting
owners can fight to preserve the positive externalities produced by
green space.
The Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, we describe conven
tional theories that predict underprovision and overexploitation of
parks and green spaces, and urge government intervention to resolve
these difficulties. We then show how these conventional theories
overlook the corollary problem of conserving parks and green spaces
consequent to government intervention. Lobbying by developers may
in many cases prompt the government to succumb to political pressure
and permit development of previously designated green areas, even
when development is undesirable.
In Part II, we discuss the empirical evidence of the existence of de
facto antiproperty easements and their importance in preserving open
space. We then establish the details of our proposal for de j ure for
malization of such easements, and employ public choice theory to
demonstrate the desirability of our proposal.
In Part III, we broaden our analysis to demonstrate that our ap
proach to hybrid public-private goods has important implications for
the concept of commons in property theory. We show that antiprop
erty regimes build on the concept of anticommons to add a fourth
method of governing commons to the existing three mechanisms: pri-

24. See infra Part II.A.
25. YIMBY is the opposite of the more famous NIMBY ("Not In My Back Yard"). For
a discussion of NIMBY, see William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syn
drome: A Comment on Robert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhood, " 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 881 (1999); Barak D. Richman, Mandating Negotiations to Solve the NIMBY Problem:
A Creative Regulatory Response, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 223 (2001/2002).
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vatization, regulation, and reliance on public norms. Specifically, we
demonstrate that antiproperty systems create a unique hybrid of
commons and private property, and ideally preserve conservation
commons.
In Part IV, we explore the flexibility offered to policymakers by
antiproperty easements by connecting our analysis to entitlement the
ory. Specifically, with reference to our previous writings on the law of
entitlements, including takings,26 givings27 and pliability rules,28 we
show that antiproperty easements can be adapted to changing circum
stances and a variety of policies.
Finally, in Part V, we discuss potential obj ections to our proposal,
examine the alternatives to antiproperty regimes, and illuminate the
interplay between our proposal and other proposals in property and
environmental law. We conclude that antiproperty regimes will often
outperform regulation, judicial enforcement of the public-trust doc
trine, and conservation easements in ensuring conservation.
I.

PARKS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE TRAGIC

Parks and green spaces are unique goods within the world of prop
erty theory. They are, on the one hand, impure public goods, thought
to be subject to underprovision by the market.29 The traditional rem
edy for this problem is government provision.30 On the other hand,
parks are commons property, typically open to the public at large, and
thus susceptible to the problem of overexploitation.31 The standard re-

2 6. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277
(2001) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed].
27. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 547 (2001) [herein
after Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings].
28. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2002) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules] .
29. See infra note 34 for a definition of public goods. See also JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 49-74 (19 68); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE &
PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49-85 (5th ed. 1989);
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private Role, 21 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 245, 252 (2002).
30. See, e.g. , William H. Oakland, Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underpro
duction, 82 J. POL. ECON. 927 (1974).
31. See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in ETHICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV 3, 5 (J. Roland Pennock & John w. Chapman,
eds., 1 982) (A commons property is one in which "there are never any exclusionary rights.
All is privilege. People are legally free to do as they wish, and are able to do, with whatever
objects (conceivably including persons) are in the [commons]."). Elinor Ostrom defined a
"common-pool resource" as "a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently
large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from ob
taining benefits from its use." ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1 990).
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sponse to such tragedies of the commons is privatization.32 This ten
sion between the two demanded solutions - government provision,
on the one hand, and private ownership, on the other - should not
obscure the source of both underprovision and overexploitation. Both
underprovision and overexploitation stem from a collective action
problem.33 In both cases, the allocation of marginal costs and benefits
leads individual users and producers to make decisions that detract
from net social welfare, while a collective decisionmaking apparatus
would lead to optimal provision and preservation.
In this Part, we examine the collective action problem posed by
parks and bring to light an important element that has eluded tradi
tional theory. Any analysis of publicly provided goods must incorpo
rate an examination of the question of public decisionmaking. In other
words, it is not enough to note simply that mismatched incentives will
lead a privately ordered market to welfare-diminishing decisions. We
must also take account of the fact that mismatched incentives may also
lead public decisionmakers to make similarly welfare-diminishing de
cisions. For example, prodevelopment interest groups may, on account
of inherent coordination advantages, capture the political process in
order to effect inefficiently development of parks and other green ar
eas. This problem may be labeled mismanagement.
In the following sections, we aim to describe fully the trio of collec
tive action problems associated with parks: underprovision, overex
ploitation, and mismanagement. We discuss the question of the timing
of each problem, noting which problems arise ex ante (prior to provi
sion of the park) and which arise ex post (after provision). Since our
goal in this Part is to set up our discussion of ex post, rather than ex
ante, solutions to the challenge of park provision and maintenance, we
pay closer attention to overexploitation and ex post mismanagement.
We begin our discussion by laying out the theory of public goods and
commons property.
A.

Traditional Understandings of Public Goods

Pure public goods, in economic parlance, display two salient char
acteristics: lack of rivalry in consumption and nonexcludability of
benefits.34 Nonrivalry implies the inexhaustibility of the good. For

32. See Hardin, supra note 20, at 1247; see also, e.g. , Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 1 1 , 748
(1986) (discussing the privatization of shoreline to prevent the overexploitation of fish).
33. The classic work on collective action problems is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
34. The precise definition of public good is a matter of some controversy. Harold Dem
setz has argued that a good is a public good solely on the grounds of nonrivalrous consump
tion. To Demsetz, a public good which satisfies the additional condition of nonexcludability
is a "collective good." Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. &
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example, Jane can breathe all the air she wants without impinging
upon Karen's use of the air. Nonexcludability refers to the inability of
public good owners to limit use of the good. For example, if Laura
were to buy all the clean air in the world, she would not be able to
limit Jane's and Karen's ability to breathe it. These twin characteristics
are responsible for the long-recognized problem of underprovision of
public goods.35
Nonexcludability prevents producers from capturing the full mar
ginal benefit of providing a product, even though they bear the full
marginal cost. For example, suppose that Laura would like to enjoy
the benefits of a clean public street. If Laura were to pay for street
cleaning, however, she could not prevent Jane and Karen from enjoy
ing the aesthetic pleasure of a clean street free of charge. Laura, in
other words, could not block Jane's and Karen's attempts to engage in
free-riding. In this case, no individual would clean the street since the
clean street would be used for free by all, while the street cleaner
would bear the cost. Thus, from an ex ante perspective, nonexclud
ability undermines the provision of public goods.
The public goods problem may be expressed in game theoretic
fashion as a "Prisoners' Dilemma."36 Coordination of all concerned
parties leads to the most advantageous result. Absent such coordina
tion, however, public goods are underproduced.37
The traditional solution to the problem of underproduction of
public goods is government intervention.38 Indeed, for economists, the
provision of public goods is so closely connected with government that
one definition of public goods is "all those effects which a government
has on the members of society."39 Generally, government has either
subsidized or provided public goods in order to make up for under-

ECON. 293 (1970); see also RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986).
35. Importantly, the characterization of goods as public depends in large part on tech
nology. New technologies allow for exclusion from goods that were previously deemed
"public." The most famous example of this phenomenon is the invention of barbed wire. El
lickson, supra note 23.
36. See ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
1 12-14 (1980); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 72-77 (1994); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 16-28 (1982); DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 9-15 (1989); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE
OF NORMS 49-53 (1977); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Prefer
ences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377 (1998). The Prisoner's Dilemma
is often demonstrated tabularly in the form of a two-player matrix.
37. See Oakland, supra note 30.
38. See id.
39. WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONS 484 (1972).
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production; the costs of these measures, however, are borne by the
public at large, through taxation.40
B.

Tragedy of the Commons

Alongside the traditional problem of underproduction of public
goods, lies the different, but no less acute, dilemma of overexploita
tion of publicly owned goods. Garrett Hardin's The Tragedy of the
Commons famously unveiled this problem.41 Hardin illustrated the
phenomenon with the example of an open rural pasture. He posited
that shepherds would allow their herds to overgraze the pasture since
each shepherd only bears a small fraction of the marginal cost of each
use, while enjoying the full marginal benefit. The result is the tragedy
of the commons: property held in common will be overexploited.42
Hardin's oft-cited conclusion was that "[f]reedom in a commons brings
ruin to all. "43
For the sake of clarity, it must be noted that Hardin was not refer
ring to public goods, but rather to commons goods. Indeed, Hardin's
tragedy would never arise with respect to pure public goods, since
pure public goods are inexhaustible. By definition, a pure public good
may never be overexploited; the pure public good of information is
never depleted, for example, and consequently is not susceptible to
overexploitation. Impure public goods, however, may fall prey to
Hardin's tragedy.
Within the realm of impure public goods, Hardin presented an im
portant counterpoint that calls for government provision of goods.
Traditional public goods analysis focuses on the ex ante problem of
provision: the inability of producers to appropriate the full marginal
benefit of provision leads to an ex ante decision not to provide. Once
the assumption of inexhaustibility is relaxed, an ex post problem arises
as well. As Hardin noted, the mismatch between beneficiaries of
commons goods and those who bear the marginal cost of each use will
eventually lead to the "tragedy" of overexploitation.44

40. Since it is often infeasible to measure accurately individual use of public goods, the
government cannot calibrate tax payments to actual use of public goods, and thus cross
subsidization results. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of
Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 217, 226-27 (2002) (noting that
when a public good is provided by the government and financed through taxes "some will
pay more and some less than their valuation of the public good").
41. Hardin, supra note 20.
42. But see Rose, supra note 32.
43. Hardin, supra note 20, at 1244.
44. Id.

Michigan Law Review

12

(Vol. 102:1

With regard to overexploitation, public parks are generally consid
ered public goods that may acquire characteristics of private goods.45
A common example of such hybridization is the imposition of fees on
park users.46 The fee requirement eliminates the strict nonexcludabil
ity of the park. Only paying users may enter the park and enjoy its fa
cilities. Simultaneously, other aspects of the park remain non
excludable. For instance, even for nonpayers, the park produces clean
air and pleasant views. Parks are not alone in their hybrid nature;
renowned economist James Buchanan posits that "the elements of
demand for any good whether this be classified as wholly, partially, or
not at all 'public' by the standard criteria, may be factored down into
private and collective aspects."47
An example may help illustrate the problems of overexploitation
and underprovision with respect to parks. Assume that the construc
tion of a park in the city of Springfield will cost $750,000 and enhance
the welfare of the collective citizenry by $1 million, for a net societal
gain of $250,000. The land on which the park is to be built, however, is
privately owned, and the owner estimates that only $500,000 could be
collected in fees from potential park users; the other benefits take the
form of clean air and aesthetic beauty accessible to nonpayers from
outside the park. Absent government intervention - or some other
form of collective action - Springfield will not build the park, pro
viding a classic illustration of underprovision.
Suppose, therefore, that Springfield takes the property through its
power of eminent domain and creates an open-access park, funded by
taxes imposed equally on the entire population - say, a tax of $1 per
person on a population of 750,000. The ex ante problem of underpro
vision is assuaged by government intervention, but an ex post problem
of overexploitation is created in its stead. Under an open access
regime, all Springfield residents will use the park, even though overuse
means trampling vegetation, tearing up turf, and generating litter be
yond the city's ability to clean. Any individual Springfield citizen will
pay $1 regardless of whether he or she uses the park, and therefore the
marginal cost of each individual use is $0. On the other hand, each use
provides enjoyment to the citizen, creating a marginal benefit greater
than $0. Springfield citizens will therefore use the park until its de45. For an analysis of parks and open spaces as public goods, see, for example, Marla E.
Mansfield, When "Private" Rights Meet "Public" Rights: The Problems of Labeling and
Regulatory Takings, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 203 (1994) (extending "public goods" analysis
to sound ecological management). Cf Thompson, supra note 29, at 252 (stating that
" [a]lthough no empirical study has been conducted, the bulk of the benefits from most land
conservation may not constitute public goods").
46. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN:
PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL
CHOICE 21 (1999).
47. Id.
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struction. Importantly, raising taxes will not solve the problem of dis
torted personal incentives. No matter how high taxes are, the marginal
cost of each use will remain zero since there is no relationship between
tax liability and use. Residents will continue using the park so long as
their marginal benefit is positive.48
C.

The A nti-Conservation Bias

Parks are impure public goods on two counts. First, many parks
may be fenced in to exclude nonpaying users. Admittedly, with respect
to some parks, exclusion is not cost-effective. Especially with respect
to large parks, the cost of erecting and maintaining fences may often
outweigh the benefits.49 Moreover, many would oppose a limited
access regime for parks on distributive and ideological grounds.so The
distributive concern is that limited access to parks would invariably
exclude the least-well-off members of society, depriving them of rec
reational opportunities and nature. The ideological opposition is that
nature must remain accessible to all, free of the restraints of private
property.s1
Second, parks admit of nonrivalrous uses only to a certain point.
While low intensity uses in moderation, such as bird watching, are
nonrivalrous, uses beyond a certain intensity or frequency are incom
patible. For example, intensive hunting is not likely to be compatible
with intensive hiking within a confined area. Indeed, conservation - if
defined as preserving nature in its pristine state without human inter
ference - is likely to rival every other use.s2
On the surface, conservation, as an anti-use, appears to be a low
intensity use that seems to be inversely symmetrical to other uses of
undeveloped property. The symmetry is false, however, since many
uses are compatible with one another, while conservation is incom
patible with all.s3 To illustrate this further, it is helpful to return to the
tragedy of the commons. Standard analysis of commons property
always posits a group of users who wish to exploit the resources in
some way - be it logging, grazing, farming, or mining. The inevitable
48. Of course, considerable tax increases may lead voters to press for a different government decision regarding the park. We address this issue in infra Part l.D.
49. See Ellickson, supra note 23.
50. We remain agnostic with respect to the cogency of the two concerns.
51. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 163 (1998).
52. In this definition of conservation, we do not mean to exclude no-impact and low
impact uses.
53. We presume, for simplicity's sake, that all other uses involve "human interference"
incompatible with our definition of conservation. For a general discussion of the false allure
of symmetry in describing rights, see Daphne Barak-Erez & Ron Shapira, The Delusion of
Symmetric Rights, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297 (1999).
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result of this assumption is that holding property in commons is inexo
rably accompanied by excessive use of resources. The standard story
fails to consider the possibility of a preference for conservation (or
other highly demanding use). If one assumes that some of the common
owners wish to conserve rather to consume, a very different problem
arises. Since conservation is incompatible with any mode of exploita
tion, conservationists and exploiters will find themselves on a collision
course. Since a commons regime permits every group member to use
the property as she wishes, however, conservationists will almost cer
tainly lose. Nonconservationists, however, will not necessarily lose
since their competitors' use will often still leave enough of the re
source for them to use, at least in the short term. Ironically, the con
servationists' sure loss occurs despite the fact that conservation as an
anti-use is the only preference that does not lead to depletion, and
thus averts the tragedy of the commons.
Hence, in an open access regime, conservation is sure to lose out,
joined only by the most highly demanding uses. And yet at the same
time, conservation is also the one use that, if universally shared, aligns
individual and group welfare. In a commons, it only takes one person
who fails to share the conservation preference to undo the conserva
tion equilibrium.
D.

Conserving Government-Provided Public Goods

While traditional theorists debate extensively the measures re
quired to ensure the provision of public goods, they generally do not
connect the discussion to an equally extensive examination of the
question of how government actually makes choices. Rather, the tradi
tional discussion of public goods has treated government as an ideal
ized provider in accordance with the collective interest.54 This ideal
ized view of government is belied by the more complex political
realities as captured by the teachings of public choice theory. Public
choice teaches that government, no less than any other institution, is
an arena in which participants seek to maximize their welfare.
Accordingly, the decisions made by government are driven by
rent-seeking, and such decisions often fail to coincide with the collec
tive good.55
There are various views as to which rent-seekers generally domi
nate the political process - agents (the politicians), interest groups, or
54. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS 203-04 (1995) (noting that this view is often labeled, not entirely accurately, as
"Pigovian" or "Pigouvian").
55. See, e.g. , DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Im
plications of Public Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA L. REV. 275, 294-95 (1988)
(describing the social costs of rent-seeking statutes).
.
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majorities. For simplicity's sake, suppose a world in which decisions
are made according to the net value of campaign contributions. Let us
suppose further that campaign contributions are made on the basis of
voters' perceived self-interest. While eschewing the question as to
whether agents, majorities, or interest groups are likely to dominate
the political process, we posit that the distortions produced by rent
driven decisionmaking may undermine both the production and pres
ervation of parks.56
Consider again our earlier example of the potential park in the city
of Springfield. Assume that the park is now established, and that it
provides a net benefit of $1 million to the 750,000 residents of Spring
field, i.e., a net benefit of $1.33 per resident. Concrete Jungle, Inc., a
private construction company, estimates that if it could build a parking
lot on the space occupied by the park, it would generate a profit, net
of building and other expenses, of $200,000. In an ideal world, the
proposed project would not be built since it is a less efficient use.
Maintaining the park benefits social welfare by $1 million, while
building the project yields a gain of only $200,000; thus, the net effect
of building the project is a social loss of $800,000. Introducing public
choice theory, however, demonstrates the perils of relying upon overly
simplistic models.57
To explore the insights of public choice theory, let us now add
three assumptions to the story. First, suppose that each potential bene
ficiary of the land use will make a campaign contribution up to the
level of her net benefit. Second, suppose that due to administrative
costs, no campaign contribution of less than $5 will be accepted. Third,
suppose that organizing citizens into lobbies costs $5 per person.
Given this political structure, Concrete Jungle will be able to go for
ward with its inefficient plan. Concrete Jungle will be ready to con
tribute up to $200,000 in campaign contributions in order to lobby for
the land use change it desires. By contrast, conservationists will not be
able to contribute even one penny. Individual residents of Springfield
would each be ready to contribute up to $1 .33 in campaign contribu
tions toward conservation of the park. Their contributions would not
be accepted by politicians or lobbying groups, however, given adminis
trative and organization costs. And, given coordination costs of $5
against a benefit of only $1.33, no resident will undertake to organize
her own lobby. Thus, in a system in which votes reflect campaign con
tributions, Concrete Jungle will defeat conservationists.
56. Our model is loosely modeled on the observations of Mancur Olson. See OLSON,
supra note 33; see also TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Bu
chanan et al. eds., 1 980); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
57. For simplicity's sake, we do not yet take account of disparities among residents'
ability to enjoy the park's positive externalities. For discussion based upon relaxation of this
assumption, see Part II.A.
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Naturally, the result we obtained in our Springfield example de
pends on our assumptions, including the presumed cost structure and
administrative expenses. Nevertheless, the example shows that ordi
nary political decision structures may lead to decisions undermining a
beneficial decision to provide parks. Indeed, there is ample reason to
believe that our hypothetical example is emblematic of the political
choice structure regarding parks. Parks produce widely diffused bene
fits, where most beneficiaries enjoy a relatively small gain. The com
peting development interest produces a concentrated benefit, where
each beneficiary enjoys a large gain. Given the existence of organiza
tion costs, conservation interests operate under a substantial disadvan
tage.
One might object to our analysis on the ground that Mancur
Olson's traditional minoritarian model of politics, under which small
interest groups with low coordination costs have an inherent advan
tage over larger, yet more diffuse groups, is overly simplistic. After all,
votes also matter, and democratic elections favor majorities. This ob
j ection has not escaped the attention of public choice theoreticians.
Indeed, some public choice scholars have rejected the interest group
model of political decisionmaking and developed an alternative model
under which the outcome of the political process is shaped by two
countervailing forces: the minoritarian force and the majoritarian
force.58 The minoritarian force represents the influence interest groups
exert over the political process through superior organization and
funding. The majoritarian force embodies the ability of the majority to
affect political decisionmaking through voting. Because the two forces
often pull in opposite directions, the outcomes of political processes
cannot be determined in the abstract. Rather, it depends on the inter
play among various factors such as intensity of preferences, the distri
bution of benefits and costs, and the severity of the coordination
problem faced by the majority.
It is important to understand, however, that the incorporation of
the majoritarian force does not guarantee optimal decisionmaking.59
The majoritarian force mitigates to some extent the ability of interest
groups to capture the political process, but it does not eliminate the
inherent advantage of organized groups. When the gains from devel
opment are substantial, the group pursuing development can increase
campaign contributions to offset the potential loss in popularity.
Moreover, the organized group can pass some of the gains to members

58. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 53-CJ7 (1994), and authorities cited therein.
59. Indeed, as Kenneth Arrow demonstrated in what has come to be known as his "im
possibility theorem," there is no system of collective choice that consistently produces co
herent choices in accordance with voters' preferences. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICES
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
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of the majority - either in the form of cash or in-kind benefits - to
ameliorate their opposition to the project. Thus, at the end of the day,
the incorporation of the majoritarian force into the model affects the
magnitude of the distortion caused by interest groups, but it certainly
does not imply socially optimal outcomes.
Moreover, whether subject to minoritarian or majoritarian domi
nation, distortions in government decisionmaking, such as fiscal illu
sion, are likely to make parks vulnerable. The standard account of fis
cal illusion predicts that government decisionmakers will ignore all
social costs and benefits that do not specifically appear in the govern
mental budget.60 Accordingly, when considering parks, municipal deci
sionmakers are disposed to looking at revenues from taxes, fines, and
other sources, on the one hand, and operational costs, on the other.61
This limited prism disadvantages public parks in two complemen
tary ways. The first is the high maintenance cost of parks. Flowers
need watering, trees and shrubbery necessitate trimming, trails require
upkeeping, and the grounds as a whole demand constant cleaning and
monitoring. These services impose a substantial burden on the
municipal budget, and turn parks, especially in times of economic
distress, into primary candidates for the budgetary axe.
The second disadvantage is the perceived negative effect of parks
on municipal tax bases. Public parks and green space do not contrib
ute to the pool of taxable resources. On the contrary, parks occupy
valuable property whose development into residential and commercial
projects could substantially increase the municipal tax bases. Thus, the
development of parks not only eliminates a budgetary liability but also
promises more revenues in property taxes.62 Fiscal illusion can be par
ticularly devastating to decisionmaking when beneficiaries of parks
and those who fund the parks' continued existence come from differ
ent jurisdictions.
Finally, the possibility that the agents - government decisionmak
ers - may make decisions based on illicit rents cannot be ignored.
Sadly, government corruption may make public assets vulnerable, as

60. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: A n
Economic Analysis, 7 2 CAL L . REV. 569, 621 (1984).
61. See Crompton, supra note 10, at 1-2.
In contrast to the enhanced tax revenues accruing from development, contemporary conven
tional wisdom among many elected officials and decision makers is that open space and park
land is a costly investment from which a community receives no economic return. The social
merit of such investment is widely accepted, but social merit amenities frequently are re
garded as being of secondary importance when budget priorities are established.

Id.
62. See id. at 1 ("Government officials often seek to enhance the tax bases of their
communities by encouraging development. There is a widespread belief that this strategy
raises additional revenues from property taxes, which then can be used to improve commu
nity services without increasing the taxes of existing residents.").
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decisionmakers sell off public assets for private gain. The case of the
Bureau of Land Management is illustrative. Part of the Interior
Department, the Bureau of Land Management is responsible for over
260 million acres of public land. A major function of the Bureau is to
"trade parcels with private landowners who want to acquire govern
ment land for commercial development."63 For years, federal auditors
have expressed concern that the agency consistently underappraises
government land in trades with private developers.64 For example, in
one trade in Nevada, involving seventy acres of public land, the agency
appraised the land transferred to the developer at $763,000; yet, the
developer sold it the next day for $4.6 million, for a profit of 600% .65
In another recent case, the Bureau hired "an employee of a private
developer to work in the land management office as an agency official.
His job was to manage land exchanges being pursued by the
developer. "66
Last year, the Appraisal Foundation, a private group authorized by
Congress to set appraisal standards for government agencies, finally
launched an investigation into the practices of the Bureau of Land
Management. The findings were so alarming that, in its report, the
Foundation said that "the bureau's appraisals were so often the sub
ject of political influence and potentially criminal abuse that the
agency should no longer be allowed to carry them out."67 The Founda
tion further suggested an immediate moratorium on all land ex
changes, adding that the Bureau's "past and currently proposed land
exchanges, and their implications for the public trust, clearly warrant
comprehensive investigation from outside the Department of the
Interior. "68
While the Bureau of Land Management's case by no means im
plies that all other government agencies are guilty of the same con
duct,69 it does suggest that public officials may not be the best guardi
ans of public parks and open space. Indeed, there is ample reason to
believe that, like any other agent,7° notwithstanding the law, public
63. See Joel Brinkley, A U.S. Agency Is Accused of Collusion in Land Deals, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at A16.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Indeed, a similar investigation into the practices of the Forest Service did not reveal
any improprieties. See id.
70. On agency problems, see, for example, Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Pro
duction, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM . ECON. REV. 777 (1972),
and Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See also Ellickson, supra
note 23, at 1327-28 ( explaining how private property regimes lower monitoring costs ) .
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officials may seek to maximize their own utility, rather than that of
their principal, the public at large.
E.

Public Goods and Pigou

In this Part we explained why, ex ante, provision of public goods
requires government intervention; for example, nonrivalrousness and
nonexcludability of air may require government provision of clean air.
We then demonstrated, however, that an initial government decision
to provide an impure public good does not necessarily secure its ex
post preservation. Two effects are liable to produce this unhappy re
sult. First, the tragedy of the commons predicts that open access
spaces are prone to overexploitation and, ultimately, destruction.
Second, distortions in the political process created by politicians' fiscal
illusion, rent-seeking, and citizens' coordination costs are apt to cause
the political process to bow to antipreservation forces (both ex post
and ex ante) .
The failing of traditional models to account for ex post distortions
can be traced to a common failing of Pigovian models of decision
making.71 In the Pigovian model, the government is assumed to make
decisions that maximize public welfare.72 Unfortunately, this romantic
assumption does not represent reality. Modern political theorists
widely agree that the interests of government actors and the interest of
the public are not perfectly aligned. Public choice models posit that
government actors may seek to maximize their own welfare, leading to
decisions that are suboptimal for the public.73 Thus, while a Pigovian
government would carefully preserve parks and other impure public
goods for public use, a public choice government is likely to cater to
the preferences of interest groups or self-interested politicians.
II.

THE SOLUTION OF ANTIPROPERTY EASEMENTS

Given the expected failings of the political process outlined in the
previous Part, one might wonder how any parks or open access green
spaces survive in urban areas. After all, development interests have
low coordination costs and a clear incentive to draw the public spaces
into their private realms. Indeed, one would expect development
interests to benefit from particularly low transaction costs in the
domain of politics, as they are well-organized repeat players who are

71 . The name Pigovian comes from the famed economist A. C. Pigou, who is commonly,
if inaccurately, thought to have been loyal to a model of the government as a neutral servant
of the public good. See A.C. P!GOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (2d ed. 1924 ) ; see also
FISCHEL, supra note 54, at 203-04.
72. See FISCHEL, supra note 54, at 203-04.
73. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 55, at 22.
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intimately familiar with the political process. Yet, the empirical results
fail the theory. In many American cities, notwithstanding the obvious
pecuniary benefits of development, large public green spaces thrive,
despite being open access.74 What explains this seemingly anomalous
result?
We posit that the explanation for green space preservation lies in
the existence of another commonly overlooked interest group: proxi
mate-property owners. Unlike the public at large for whom the bene
fits from parks are relatively small and coordination costs are often
prohibitive, proximate-property owners receive sufficiently substantial
benefit from green space to overcome inertia. Open spaces benefit
adjacent homeowners in ways distinct from the public at large. We ex
amine this phenomenon by exploring, first, the evidence for enhanced
value of neighboring properties (known as "proximate-property
value"), and, then, the political results of that value. We then show the
shortcomings of the current de facto system of conservation protec
tion, and demonstrate that those shortcomings can be resolved by
formalizing a system of antiproperty rights.
A. Proximate-Property Value
Previously, we assumed that all members of the public are equally
situated to consume publicly provided goods. In our Springfield hypo
thetical, for instance, we assumed that the park provided equal bene
fits to all members of the public at large, albeit in two different capaci
ties: first, as direct users of park services, and, second, as beneficiaries
of clean air, aesthetic beauty, and the like. In reality, however, mem
bers of the public are not similarly situated to enjoy the benefits of the
park. Proximate-property owners because of their location derive
unique benefits unavailable to the public at large. They may enjoy
park services more easily and more frequently. The park's aesthetic
beauty is particularly beneficial to those who enjoy it every day by
reason of their proximity. Finally, the park provides proximate
property owners with publicly provided substitutes for private yards
and acoustic barriers. Naturally, as we noted, these advantages are re
flected in property values.
Numerous empirical studies show that parks and open spaces con
tribute to the value of surrounding real estate. Although parks and
open spaces are not private goods that are supplied by markets, they
represent a "capitalization" for proximate landowners, and thus their
economic effect is reflected, to some degree, in the value of neighbor
ing properties. The added value of abutting parks, while not inde
pendently marketable, may be measured by a comparison of proper74. To be sure, in some areas, green space has not fared as well. See examples cited infra
in Section II.C.7.
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ties that abut parks with those that do not. In economic parlance, this
valuation method is called "hedonic pricing."75
The "proximate-property principle,'' which posits that properties
in proximity to parks enjoy enhanced value, achieved fame thanks to
Fredrick Law Olmsted. Olmsted successfully invoked this principle to
convince the city of New York to move forward with his plan for con
structing Central Park.76 While at the time the study of statistics was
insufficiently developed to offer a reliable method for isolating the ef
fect of parks on property value from other economic effects,77 it was
widely believed that the positive impact of abutting parks was consid
erable.7s Indeed, the highly publicized success of Central Park
prompted calls for constructing parks throughout the country at the
turn of the twentieth century.79
The first rigorous empirical studies on the economic effect of parks
appeared in the 1970s. The overwhelming majority of the studies re
ported a significant positive effect in both urban and rural areas. For
example, a 1974 study analyzed the effect of Pennypack Park in north
eastern Philadelphia on 336 nearby properties.so The study found that
the park accounted for 33 % of the value of the land that was 40 feet
away from the park, 9% of the value of the property at 1 ,000 feet, and
4.2% of the land value at 2,500 feet.s1
Another oft-cited study from 1978 examined the effect of green
belts on properties in Boulder, Colorado.s2 The regression analyses re
vealed a $4.20 price decrease for every foot one moved away from the
green space.s3 In percentages, this means that the greenbelts were re75. See Crompton, supra note 10, at 2. This means, of course, that the negative effect of
parks and open space on municipalities' tax bases is smaller than commonly thought. The
increased value of properties near parks implies higher property taxes. Thus, the change in
property values created by public spaces partially offsets the fiscal illusion that undermines
the creation of parks. Cf supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
76. Crompton, supra note 10, at 7. Indeed, Olmsted was so persuasive that in a letter
from 1856, the New York City Comptroller wrote, "the increase in taxes by reason of the
enhancement of values attributable to the park would afford more than sufficient means for
the interest incurred for its purchase and improvement without any increase in the general
rate of taxation." Id. (quoting METROPOLITAN CONFERENCE OF CITY AND STATE PARK
AUTHORITIES 12 (1 926)).
77. The first sophisticated method that enabled researchers to isolate the effect of parks
from other economic factors was published in Charles Herrick, The Effects of Parks Upon
Land and Real Estate Values, 5 PLANNERS' J. 89 (1939).
78. See Crompton, supra note 10, at 7-8.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Thomas R. Hammer et al., The Effect of a Large Urban Park on Real Estate Value,
40 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 274 (1974).
81. Id. at 277.
82. Mark R. Correll et al., The Effects of Greenbelts on Residential Property Values:
Some Findings on the Political Economy of Open Space, 54 LAND ECON. 207 (1978).
83. Id. at 211 .
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sponsible for a price increase of up to 32% in the value of adjacent
properties, relative to properties located 3,200 feet away.
Likewise, a Massachusetts study from the early 1980s on the
impact of four parks on nearby properties reported that, on average, a
house located twenty feet away from a park sold for $2,675 more than
a house located 2,000 feet away.84 The study further found that 80% of
the added value was captured by properties within 500 feet from the
park.85 No effect was observed for properties more than 2,000 feet
away from the park.86
A 1 985 study from Ohio echoed the previous findings.87 The study
focused on two parks: Cox Arboretum in Dayton and Whetstone Park
in Columbus. The results indicated that a one-foot remove from the
park represented a price decrease of $3.83 in the case of the former,
and a $4.87 in the case of the latter.88 The average park premium was
5.1 3 % for properties in the Cox Arboretum subdivision, and 7.35%
for residential properties in the vicinity of Whetstone Park.89
Surprisingly perhaps, empirical studies also indicate that parks and
open spaces can enhance property values even in nonurban areas. For
example, a 1 978 study of the values of privately owned properties in
the Adirondack Forest Preserve in upstate New York reported that
being adjacent to state land increased property value by $20 per acre,90
which represented a 17.5% increase in value.91 Similarly, a 1993 study
from Maryland showed that the preservation of a significant tract of
forest land increased the value of houses in Baltimore County (within
one mile of the site), by at least 10%, and houses in the neighboring
Carroll and Howard Counties by at least 8% and 4 % respectively.92
Not all empirical studies support the proximate-property principle.
For instance, a 1986 study of Westchester County, New York, con-

84. J. Hagert et al., Benefits From Open Space and Recreational Parks: A Case Study, 11
J. NORTHEASTERN AGRIC. ECON. COUNCIL 1 3 (1982); Thomas A More et al., The Eco
nomics of Urban Parks: A Benefit/Cost Analysis, PARKS & RECREATION, Aug. 1982, at 3133.
85. H agert, supra note 84; More, supra note 84.
86. Hagert, supra note 84; More, supra note 84.
87. Crompton, supra note 10, at 17 (citing M. Kimmel, Parks and Property Values: An
Empirical Study in Dayton and Columbus, Ohio (1985) (unpublished Master's thesis, Miami
University, Oxford, Ohio)).
88. Id. (citing Kimmel, supra note 87).
89.

Id.

(citing Kimmel, supra note 87).

90. See David H. Vrooman, An Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Land Values in
the Adirondack Park, 37 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 1 65, 173 (1978).
91. Crompton, supra note 10, at 23.
92. Id. (citing R.E. Curtis, Valuing Open Space in Maryland: An Hedonic Analysis
(1993) (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Maryland)).
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eluded that parks have no impact on the value of proximate property.93
Such studies, however, represent the minority view. In a comprehen
sive review of the extant empirical literature, Crompton reported that
twenty out of the twenty-five studies he reviewed were supportive of
the proximate-property principle.94 Crompton further noted that of the
remaining five cases, four may have produced "ambivalent findings"
as the result of "methodological limitations."95 In summarizing the
empirical findings, Crompton wrote:
[I]t is suggested that a positive impact of 20% on property values abut
ting or fronting a passive park area is a reasonable starting point guide
line. If the park is large (say over 25 acres), well-maintained, attractive,
and its use is mainly passive, then this figure is likely to be low. If it is
small and embraces some active use, then this guideline is likely to be
high. If it is a heavily used park incorporating such recreation facilities as
athletic fields or a swimming pool, then the proximate value increment
may be minimal on abutting properties but may reach 10% on properties
two or three blocks away.96

As we show, this proximate-property value that accrues to nearby
neighbors substantially affects the continued existence of the park.
The unique stake of a particular group in the park creates a set of pri
vate owners who may play a special role in conservation.97
B.

The De Facto Rights of Neighbors

To see how the special interest of proximate homeowners aids con
servation and changes the predicted anti-conservation outcome
prophesied by the analysis of the previous Part, let's return to our
Springfield hypothetical. So far, we assumed the park produced net
public benefits of $1 million, spread evenly among the 750,000 resi
dents of the city. Given this distribution, and the cost of organizing
politically, we concluded that beneficiaries of the park would be
unable to fend off the inefficient development proposal of Concrete

93. Crompton, supra note 10, at 27 (citing J.A.Yoegel, An Inquiry Into the Impact of
Park Land Location Upon Single Family Residential Property Values in Middle and Upper
Income Communities in Westchester County (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New
York University)).
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 29.
97. There may be rare cases in which there is an inherent clash between the interests of
proximate-property owners and those of the public at large. For example, there may be in
stances in which the proximate-property owners all despise a certain historical site (such as a
sports stadium which produces noise and crowds), while the more distant public enjoys and
supports the continued existence of the site. In such cases, obviously, proximate property
owners do not serve as good proxies of the public interest, and antiproperty easements, as
we shall describe them, will not be useful policy tools.
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Jungle, Inc., whose project would produce a net benefit of only
$200,000.
Let us now change the example by incorporating a more realistic
distribution of benefits. Assume that the thousand nearest neighbors
of the park capture 25% of the benefits produced by the park. Under
this distribution, each of the thousand nearest neighbors stands to gain
$250 from the existence of a park. The other $750,000 in benefits are
divided among the remaining 749,000 residents of Springfield, giving
each a benefit of slightly over $1. We retain the premise that only
campaign contributions of $5 or more will be accepted, and that deci
sions are made strictly in accordance with the amount of money re
ceived. While under a uniform distribution of benefits Concrete
Jungle could move forward with its inefficient construction plan,
Concrete Jungle would be unable to implement its development pro
posal under this more realistic distribution of benefits. This is because
each of the thousand nearest neighbors will make campaign contribu
tions of up to $250 to preserve the park and stop construction.98 In
turn, the $250,000 in total contributions will outweigh the maximum
amount of $200,000 Concrete Jungle would be willing to pledge. Thus,
the existence of a concentrated group of property owners who benefit
disproportionately from the park may secure the economically effi
cient result and benefit the public at large.
The phenomenon of a small group of proximate-property owners
blocking inefficient development may also be illustrated by some real
world examples. Recently, in south Florida, neighborhood residents
successfully thwarted an effort to convert a planned park expansion
into a commercial development.99 In Glastonbury, Connecticut, resi
dents came together to oppose the construction of a large shopping
center on nearby property, demanding that the property be used as a
park or open space.100 Motivated by a concern that the proposed
development would affect, inter alia, "extremely fragile wetlands,"
some residents "are waging a campaign to kill the proposal" currently
pending before the local conservation commission.101 Likewise, a
group of neighbors and business owners from Grand Rapids,
Michigan, formed a united front to oppose the development of John
Ball Park and Zoo,102 ultimately defeating the plan.
98. Of course, our example includes many simplifying assumptions, and ignores such
factors as coordination costs and collective action problems. We address these factors in the
next Section.
99. See Jeremy Milarsky, Building Near Park Rejected, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Feb. 6, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2945260.
100. Eric R. Danton, Neighbors Fight Shopping Center; Developer Addresses Concerns
with Plan to Protect Wetland, HARTFORD COURANT, May 22, 2002, at B2.
101. Id.
102. Kyla King, Group Forms to Oppose Zoo Plan: The Residents and Business Owners
Want to Present a "United Front, " GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 12, 2001, at A20.
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The Shortcomings of De Facto Rights

The above examples illustrate that sometimes proximate-property
owners' special interest in conservation is strong enough to bar ineffi
cient development of lands. At other times, however, proximate
property owners' efforts at conservation are thwarted by a complex set
of strategic considerations that generate a collective action problem.103
To illuminate these difficulties, let's revisit our Springfield example
and our basic assumptions: the park produces public benefits of $1
million for the city's 750,000 residents, 25% of which are captured by
the nearest 1 ,000 neighbors. Concrete Jungle wishes to convert the
park into a project that will produce $200,000 for the corporation.
Political decisions are made in accordance with the magnitude of cam
paign contributions, and no contribution of less than $5 is accepted.
Earlier, we suggested that the nearby neighbors would be able to
defeat the inefficient development scheme. Ignoring issues of coordi
nation, we suggested that the neighbors could pledge up to $250,000 in
campaign contributions - a sum that would outweigh Concrete
Jungle's contribution of $200,000.
The introduction of strategic considerations into the discussion,
however, changes the result considerably. Thus, we now consider six
different strategic problems that may undermine the neighbors' quest
to save their park: free-riding, the need for an entrepreneur or organ
izer, agency problems, insufficient group size, skewed distribution of
benefits or burdens, and the likelihood that developers are repeat
players.
1.

Free-riding

To understand the free-riding problem, consider the case of
Freddie Freeloader, one of the nearby neighbors. He knows that if
Concrete Jungle succeeds in developing the park, his property will lose
$250 in value. Naturally, if Freddie knew that his contribution would
be decisive in the campaign against the project he would donate up to
$250 in order to preserve the park. As his name suggests, however,
Freddie is a freeloader, and would prefer to let others do the job for
him. He knows that his 999 neighbors also stand to lose $250 each, and
if they each contribute $200.21 or more, Concrete Jungle's initiative
will fail. Thus, Freddie will keep his money and let his neighbors make
their contributions. Of course, Freddie is not an outlier; he is the pro
totypical self-interest maximizer. Where enough neighboring owners
are like Freddie, Concrete Jungle will succeed in destroying the park.

103. For an alternative discussion of the political failures of environmental protection,
see Johnston, supra note 15.
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Each of the neighbors will prefer to let their fellow neighbor contrib
ute, and thus, no contributions will be made to preserve the park.104
2.

Entrepreneurs and Organizers

The free-riding problem might be solved by enforcement mecha
nisms such as social norms - the common name for informal social
rules enforced by social conventions such as the norm of tipping at res
taurants - or altruistic behavior.105 And yet the conservation effort
may falter even with such enforcement mechanisms in place. For a
conservation effort to succeed, it is not enough to have the goodwill of
the neighbors and their willingness to contribute campaign funds.
Someone must organize the effort and spearhead the political cam
paign. The activists must be instructed where to contribute their funds
and when; a common message must be drafted; connections with local
politicians must be established; meetings must be held to coordinate
action; and someone must give feedback to the activists to help them
monitor the effectiveness of the campaign. Obviously, the organizer of
this campaign will have to expend efforts well beyond those of the
rank and file, and those efforts may well exceed her personal pecuni
ary stake in the dispute. Moreover, the need for an entrepreneur or
organizer exacerbates the free-riding problem; even where neighbors
see fit to contribute funds, few will want to bear the high costs associ
ated with the leadership role. Here, again, unless a collective mecha
nism is developed for selecting and compensating the organizer, the
conservation campaign may never get off the ground.106
To illustrate, we return to Springfield. Assume that Robin
Rabblerouser contemplates leading the conservation effort. She esti
mates the expected cost in time and effort at $5,000. Yet, her personal
stake in the park is a mere $250. Unless Robin can somehow be com
pensated for the remaining $4,750, she will shy away from the leader
ship role.107

104. On free-riding and its role in foiling political organization, see Joseph P. Kalt &
Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON.
REV. 279, 285 (1984).
105. See Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821, 1821
(2000) (demonstrating the use of social norms to prevent free-riding for taxation); Richard
H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and
Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1027 (1995) (describing social norms as a
non-legal method of preventing undesirable actions like free-riding).
106. On the importance of an organizing entrepreneur, see TERRY M. MOE, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS (1980).
107. The compensation may be psychic as well as pecuniary, which may explain why, in
some cases, entrepreneurs do emerge notwithstanding the absence of a payment mechanism.
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Agency Problems

The need for a leader and other specialized roles invariably intro
duces an agency problem in the conservationist camp. Each person
with a specialized role faces a different utility function - and there
fore a different set of incentives - than the rest of the group. Robin
Rabblerouser, for example, must consider not only the cost of cam
paign contributions and the benefit of park preservation; she must also
consider the cost of her leadership role and the benefit of her compen
sation scheme. This creates a danger that she may decide to under
mine the conservation effort in order to advance her personal benefit.
For instance, Concrete Jungle may promise to pay Robin $20,000 to
send inaccurate signals to the activists. This sum would dwarf the
$4,750 in compensation that induced her to take on the leadership role
and the $250 in park benefits that are at stake for her. Robin may also
accept compromise proposals that benefit her but not the group at
large. The existence of an agency problem creates the need for moni
toring, to be carried out by yet a new set of agents. The need for mul
tiple agents imposes additional costs to the conservation effort, and, at
a minimum, creates distrust among the conservationists.108
4.

Group Size

The conservation effort will obviously also be affected by the size
of the group of neighbors. As the group grows in size, it becomes
increasingly difficult to coordinate actions among the group. To act in
concert, the conservationists will need to introduce mechanisms for
intragroup communication. To make matters worse, as the group size
grows beyond the ability of the members to know one another, social
norms and other informal regulatory mechanisms become less effec
tive. This imposes two more sets of transaction costs within the con
servationist camp: communication costs and monitoring costs.109
5.

Skewed Distribution

The pattern of distribution of benefits from the park is closely
related to the question of group size, and it too may hinder effective
coordination. Returning to Springfield, assume that there are only 100
proximate-property owners, and their share of the benefits is only
10%, rather than 25% . In such a case, the nearby neighbors would
each enjoy a benefit of $1,000 each, while other residents of the city
would each enjoy a benefit of approximately $1.20. The group of con108. See supra note 70.
109. See generally Hardin, supra note 36 (discussing role of group size in overcoming
collective action problems).
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servationists would raise - assuming no other coordination problems
- $100,000 in campaign contributions. This sum would be insufficient
to counter Concrete Jungle's expected contribution of up to $200,000.
Thus, the existence of a group of specially benefited homeowners is
not enough in itself to protect the park. In addition to all its other dif
ficulties, the group must represent a collective interest sufficiently
large to outweigh the interest of the competing developerY0
6.

Repeat Players

Finally, we must consider the possibility that there will be repeated
rounds of political decisionmaking. We have assumed thus far that
each decision of the city was discrete and based solely on campaign
contributions related to the specific decision at hand. But in reality,
the city makes many decisions over the course of time, and decision
makers motivated solely by campaign contributions will have to cal
culate the effect of their decisions on future fundraising drives in addi
tion to the present round of contributions. Generally, abutting
homeowners will not be repeat players in the political process, as they
will rarely have interests at stake that are sufficiently large as to
warrant repeated campaign contributions. On the other hand, devel
opment companies are more likely to have a number of interests that
warrant continuous participation in the political arena.111
Concrete Jungle, for example, is an ongoing concern, and its inter
ests are not restricted to this single park. Concrete Jungle has devel
oped other properties, and it will have future development projects
that will lead it to shower contributions upon friendly politicians. Poli
ticians may want to avoid alienating Concrete Jungle to avoid jeop
ardizing future campaign gifts. Thus, even though in our example
Concrete Jungle will want to contribute only $200,000, against
$250,000 in contributions that abutting owners will muster, politicians
may decide to take ·concrete Jungle's smaller contribution in order to
assure access to future contributions from the developer.
Repeated plays in the political arena may affect potential out
comes in another way. As repeat players in the political process,
developers and politicians are conscious of the signals they send to

1 10. Strictly speaking, skewed distribution as we have described it in the text does not
constitute a strategic difficulty.
1 1 1 . On repeat players, see, for example, Guido Calabresi and Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New
Directions in Ton Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1996) (observing that tort reform is
controlled by repeat players); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Operating Software,
Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 179-80 (1999) (describ
ing the pivotal role of repeat players in shaping copyright law). The classic articles analyzing
the inherent advantages of repeat players are Marc Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litiga
tion, 9 LAW & Soc•y REV. 347 (1975), and Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
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other players and potential players. Developers may find it in their in
terest to "overinvest" in campaign contributions for a development
project in order to deter anti-development forces from organizing to
block future projects. In our example, Concrete Jungle may decide to
invest more than $250,000 in campaign contributions, even though its
potential profit is only $200,000, in order to send a signal to home
owners that it is not worth organizing to fight Concrete Jungle devel
opments, because Concrete Jungle will always invest "whatever it
takes." If the signal saves Concrete Jungle more than $50,000 in the
future, it will be worth the investment.1 1 2
7.

Summary

As a result of the special burdens and costs confronting preserva
tionists, prodevelopment interest groups will often prevail in their ef
fort to push forward inefficient projects, notwithstanding the opposi
tion of proximate-property owners. Accordingly, the de facto interest
of neighbors in preserving green space will frequently fall short
of achieving the optimal equilibrium between development and
preservation.
The shortcomings of the status quo, in which proximate-property
owners lack formal legal protection for their interest in preservation,
may be summarized under two headings. First, preservationists rather
than developers bear the lion's share of transaction and coordination
costs. The preservation interest consists of widely scattered stakes, and
each of relatively small value, while the development interest is gener
ally unitary, politically savvy, and of relatively large value.113 Second,
the benefits of development generally find full expression in the politi
cal arena, while the political arena does not fully account for the bene
fits of preservation. The unitary developer fully internalizes all of the
benefits of its project and will invest up to the full value of the benefits
in order to reap a profit. Many preservationists, however, enjoy too
small a benefit to warrant participation in the political process. They
will sit on the sidelines, as the political process ignores the benefits the
conservationists could potentially enjoy. 1 14

1 12. For example, in an effort to forestall future litigation, tobacco companies fre
quently expend more litigating a claim than they would have to expend if they were to sim
ply pay the claim without contesting it. See Mary Ann K. Bosack, Cigarette Act Preemption
- Refin ing the Analysis, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 756, 757 n.8 (1991) (characterizing tobacco liti
gation costs as between $600 million and $3 billion as of 1988).
113. For a contrary view of the impact of strategic factors on political organization, see
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98
Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983).
1 14. See also Thompson, supra note 29, at 258-62 (discussing risk that government ac
tion will "crowd out" altruistic environmentalism).
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Unfortunately, our analysis of the political decisionmaking process
is not merely theoretical; it is borne out by reality. Four recent
examples demonstrate the national influence of fiscal illusion in
undermining conservation, and the potential weakness of proximate
property owners. In 2001, the city of Las Cruces, New Mexico agreed
to sell 3.2 acres of undeveloped city-owned land - one of the last such
parcels remaining in the area - to a commercial corporation for a re
ported amount of $694,000, despite the protests of proximate-property
owners.115 In explaining the decision, city manager Jim Erickson said
that the only consideration weighed by the city was "to look at the
highest and best use." 1 16 He added that "leaving the land vacant would
cost the city to maintain the land, cleaning weeds and trash." 1 17
In a similar vein, leaders of Daytona Beach, Florida "are discussing
a plan that could put the city's last swath of undisturbed green space
on the Halifax River on the auction block."1 18 Residents who oppose
the plan describe the proposal as "a sellout of public property to pri
vate development," claiming "that this time Daytona Beach is putting
a price tag on its character. "119 Yet, for the local politicians, the logic is
simple: "More marinas, more restaurants and more condominiums on
the river mean a more vibrant downtown and new tax money to shore
up finances."120
Finally, the city of Novi, Michigan realized that there must be more
than one way to appease a developer. Facing a $70 million judgment,
the city decided to settle the case by offering the plaintiff-developer,
Sandstone Associates, ninety-five acres ( ! ) of park land. 1 21 Responding
to criticism from local conservationists, city officials explained that this
extreme measure was necessary to "save the city from big tax
increases and cuts in services. "122
Fittingly, however, the "gold medal" for allowing political failures
to trump conservation interests goes to the Golden State, California,
thanks to the "ingenuity" of the city of Palm Springs. In 1986, the city
of Palm Springs "eagerly accepted"123 thirty acres of undeveloped land

1 15. Christopher Schurtz, Councilors Question Why Las Cruces, N.M., ls In Land-Sale
Business, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS, June 27, 2001.
1 1 6. Id.
1 17. Id.
1 18. Matt Donnelly, Downtown Daytona: What Next? Many Angry over Talk of Land
Sale; Protestors Try to Save Riverfront Property, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 3, 2002, at Kl.
1 1 9. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Matt Helms, Planners to Decide on Park Giveaway; Public Hearing, Vote Set
Wednesday in Novi, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 7, 2002, at lB.
122. Id.
123. Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 70 Cal. App. 4th 613, 629 (1999).

Of Property and Antiproperty

October 2003]

31

on the express condition that the property be used in perpetuity as a
desert wildlife preserve and an equestrian center.124 The grant explic
itly stated that if the condition was breached the land would pass to
"the Living Desert Reserve . . . and grantee shall forfeit all rights
thereto."125 Less than three years later, the city decided it would be
better served if the land was developed into a golf course.126 To effect
this plan, the city exercised its eminent domain power to condemn the
reversionary interest in Living Desert Reserve.127 Amazingly, the city
convinced the trial court not to award any compensation, since the
possibility of breach of condition by the city was too "remote and
speculative," and thus the future interest was valueless for the purpose
of condemnation compensation.128
These and other examples129 illustrate the systematic disadvantage
of conservation interests in the political arena.
D.

Formalizing Neighbors ' Antiproperty Rights

Having demonstrated both the benefits and the shortcomings of
the de facto rights of nearby neighbors in green space, we now show
how formalizing those rights in de jure antiproperty easements pre
serves the benefits of the de facto rights, while drastically reducing the
shortcomings.
We propose to grant every proximate-property owner a formal
legal entitlement to the preservation of green space. Specifically, each
property owner situated within a certain distance of the designated
green space - say 200 yards - will be granted a negative easement
appurtenant in the park, which we call an "antiproperty easement."
This would vest in each of the property owners the right to veto any
development or destruction of the green space. Thus, under our pro
posed regime, a developer seeking to build on the green space would
have to obtain permission, or acquire the right, from the neighboring
owners. As with all other easements, antiproperty easements would be
124. Id. at 618.
125. Id.
126. Id. The California Court of Appeals attributed the city's inconsistent behavior ei
ther to a "promissory fraud or a subsequent change of heart." Id. at 630.
127. Id. at 618.
128. Id. at 624-25. In response to this argument, the California Court of Appeals said:
"the decision to assert that position did not display the high degree of fairness, justice, and
virtue that should characterize public entities. Such inequitable behavior must not be re
warded." Id. at 630.
129. It turns out that, on occasion, even the court system poses a threat to parks. Con
sider the case of Hardy Park in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Despite opposition from neigh
bors, the park might be destroyed to make room for a new $100 million court house. See
Brittany Wallman, Judge Regains Favored Court Site: Federal Plans Upset Residents, FLA.
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 5, 2002, at 1 .B.
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formal legal rights enforceable in a court of law or equity; holders
would be entitled to injunctive relief against building without consent.
As we explain in greater detail in the next Part, however, anti
property easements differ from standard easements. Ordinarily, ease
ments appurtenant seek to optimize land use between two property
owners: the dominant parcel owner (the beneficiary) and the subservi
ent parcel owner (the benefactor). Moreover, standard easements, like
other known property rights, may be transferred voluntarily at the sole
discretion of the easement holder.13° For instance, Ollie, the owner of
Oceanside, may give Grace, the owner of Graceland, an easement
appurtenant to cross Oceanside to get to the beach. One would expect
that Fanny Faraway, who lives on the other side of town, would enjoy
no benefit whatsoever from the transaction, as her own beach access is
not affected by the easement grant. Further, if Ollie changed his mind,
and then convinced Grace to annul the transfer, there would be no
practical difficulties in eliminating the access privilege created by the
easement. In short, easements typically affect only two parties who
fully internalize, usually contractually, the costs and benefits created
by the easement.131
The antiproperty easements we propose are quite different. They
are aimed primarily at ensuring benefits for third parties and designed
to be practically (albeit not formally) inalienable. In economic par
lance, the purpose of antiproperty easements is to create a unique,
positive externality.132 The formalization of antiproperty easements
will ensure the continuous existence of parks and green space, which
will benefit not only the easement holders but also the public at large.
And by dispersing rights among multiple owners, antiproperty ease
ments create a regime that makes it exceedingly unlikely that property
owners could ever aggregate to alter or annul the negative easements.
To illustrate these critical differences, let us change slightly our
previous hypothetical. Suppose that Oceanside is a public park (not a
private estate) and that it is abutted by 100 private property owners,
each of whom enjoys a negative easement appurtenant (an antiprop
erty easement) blocking any development in Oceanside. Let us now

130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 4.6(1), 5.8 (2000);
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 14, at 830.
131. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerous Clausus Principle, 1 10 YALE L.J. 1 (2001); see also, e.g., Estate of
Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309 (N.Y. 1 987) (holding that an easement cannot be reserved
in favor of adjacent property previously owned by grantor). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 2.6(2) (2000) (stating that an easement can be created in favor of a
third party).
132. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 542 (1998) (defining positive externalities as
"the presence of an intrinsically valued institutional structure even where that structure is
not necessary to optimize social welfare").
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suppose that Donny is a developer who wishes to build a tall glass
tower on Oceanside (as he did in several locales in New York City).
We finally assume that most citizens of the town, Placidville, enjoy the
use of Oceanside and prefer to keep it in its pristine state.
The first thing to notice about the negative easements is that they
benefit the Placidville citizenry as a whole, not merely the 100
proximate-property owners. Second, the negative easements make de
velopment of Oceanside Park virtually impossible. In order for Donny
to bring his planned development to fruition, he must acquire all 100
antiproperty easements. If even one outstanding antiproperty ease
ment remains unacquired, Donny will be barred from proceeding with
his planned tall glass tower; buying ninety-nine easements is as good
as buying none.
Donny will almost invariably fail to acquire the negative ease
ments, however, since he is facing a practically insurmountable hold
out problem. Buying all the negative easements requires Donny to
engage in a sequence of transactions with the easement holders. Each
of the easement holders is effectively a monopolist since she holds a
unique asset that cannot be purchased elsewhere; there is no spot
market and no substitute good. Each monopolist easement owner will
seek to extract the entire profit of the developer in exchange for relin
quishing the veto power.
Assume that Donny expects a gross profit (net of all costs save
easement acquisition) of $100 million, a fact published in the local
media.133 Looking forward, Donny expects an average profit of $1 mil
lion from each easement transaction, less the price he actually pays the
holder. Even if limited in ability to predict the outcome of negotia
tions, the first easement holder approached by Donny, as a self
interested profit maximizer, will ask for the full $1 million.134 The sec
ond easement holder to be approached, however, will ask for more.
Now that Donny has purchased one easement, he must purchase
ninety-nine easements to enjoy the $100 million, creating an expected
profit of $1.01 million per transaction. This is because Donny rises
above the sunk-cost fallacy135 and ignores the price he has already paid
in the previous easement transaction. The second easement holder will
therefore ask for the full $1.01 million. This process will go on until the
133. We make this assumption for simplicity's sake. Of course, in many cases there are
information problems that may make the likelihood of consensual transfer less or more
likely.
134. We assume that each easement owner will seek to gain the maximum share of the
profit that will allow the project to go forward, and that each will assume similar behavior
from other owners.
135. Under the sunk-costs doctrine, "costs incurred in the past . . . should not be
counted as costs of present or future decisions." David R. Steele, Nozick on Sunk Costs, 106
ETHICS 605, 605-06 (1996). People who irrationally fail to operate under this rule have fallen
prey to the sunk-cost fallacy.
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hundredth easement owner - who will hold the key to the full $100
million in profit - asks a price of $100 million.
Worse yet for Donny, because of the dramatic disparity in bar
gaining power between those who sell early and those who sell late,
easement owners will hold out until the end of the process in order to
maximize their profits. This, of course, increases transaction costs even
further.
Indeed, there are probably no barriers to easement holders' ability
to predict the course of negotiations. A precocious first easement
holder will therefore decline to make the modest request of $1 million,
and instead ask for the same $100 million as the hundredth easement
owner. Reasoning backwards from this daunting outcome, Donny will
likely shy away from the project and devote his funds to the easier task
of building tall glass towers on nonpark land in New York City.136
Although the objective total value of the antiproperty easements
only represents the share of the abutting homeowners' interest in the
continued existence of undeveloped parks, as a practical matter the
cost of acquiring the antiproperty easements will be considerably
higher. Indeed, as a general matter, the cost of buying up the anti
property easements will be prohibitive. The holdout dynamic created
by the dispersed easements effectively protects the interest of the
public at large in conservation, even though the public's interest isn't,
technically speaking, represented.
The irony implicit in antiproperty may be described in another
way. Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental goods are
underproduced due to widely dispersed positive and negative exter
nalities.137 Overproduction of pollution, for example, is often ascribed
to the ability of polluters to externalize many of the costs of their ac
tivities to the public.138 The standard policy prescription, therefore,
calls for forcing the polluters to internalize these costs, by means of
fines, for example.139 The policy prescription relies upon the assump
tion that transaction costs are too high to allow internalization through

136. On holdouts, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 61, 109 (1986) [hereinafter Merrill, Public Use], for a description of G.M.'s difficulty
in buying a large tract in a major urban area, and Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the
Cathedral: the Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2112 (1987), for a discus
sion of the use of eminent domain to resolve holdout problems.
137. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 60 (1992) (ex
posing the problem of free-riding with regard to public goods, which in tum leads to under
production).
138. See Michael J. Gergen, Note, The Failed Promise of the "Polluter Pays" Principle:
An Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624,
627 (1994) (theorizing that the polluter should reimburse society for costs imposed on
others).
139. See id. at 628.
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private bargaining between pollution victims and producers.140 On this
view, transaction costs are the culprit for the market's failure to curb
suboptimal pollution. And if transaction costs could only be lowered
sufficiently, presumably, the market failures would dissipate.141
Indeed, it is for this reason that law and economics scholars generally
call for policymakers to craft market mechanisms that reduce transac
tion costs, in order to pave the way for unimpeded bargaining among
market participants.142
The counterintuitive goal of antiproperty easements is to create
transaction costs, which in this case are produced by strategic holdout.
Here, we rely upon two common observations that are rarely applied
together to the pollution dilemma. First, the problem of transaction
costs may be assuaged completely by allocating resources, ex ante, to
the party who would have received those resources through the mar
ket if transaction costs were low.143 Second, when transaction costs are
insurmountably high (so as to make bargaining impossible ) , the initial
allocation is dispositive144 - once allocated, the asset never moves.
Combined, these two phenomena produce the perverse outcome of
antiproperty easements. To overcome high transaction costs among
140. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (as
suming high transaction costs preclude socially optimal results); Daniel C. Esty, Toward Op
timal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1545 (1999) (acknowledging that
high transaction costs may lead to suboptimal resource allocations).
141. See Coase, supra note 140.
142. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 102 (1st ed. 1988);
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 254
(1979); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed.
1 989) (positing that when transaction costs are positive, "the preferred legal rule is the rule
that minimizes the effects of transaction costs."); Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotia
tion, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 1 95, 1 198
n.14 (1994).
143. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 90 (2d ed. 1996)
(stating that when transactions costs prevent bargaining, "the law should allocate property
rights to the party who values them the most" (emphasis omitted)). Peter Schlag summarizes
the law and economics analysis of entitlements as follows:
1. Assign entitlements to the party who most values them. 2. If it is not clear who most val
ues the entitlement, grant the entitlement to the party who can most cheaply initiate an ex
change. 3. Where transaction costs are low, grant absolute entitlements. 4. Where transac
tion costs are high, structure the legal regime to approximate the outcomes that the parties
would have reached in a zero transaction cost world. 5. Where transaction costs are high, re
structure legal entitlements so as to reduce transaction costs.

Peter Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1663 (1989) (cita
tions omitted).
144. See Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations
Law, 35 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 779, 813 (2002) (noting that when the "initial allocation of an
entitlement is inefficient, transaction costs can inhibit or prevent the transfer of the entitle
ment"); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing,
and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 143, 1151 (1999)
(pointing out that when transaction costs are high "the entitlement will stay where it is ini
tially allocated no matter what transaction rule we select") .
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victims of suboptimal or inefficient development, antiproperty ease
ments allocate the right to block such inefficient development to
nearby neighbors. To ensure that nearby neighbors adequately repre
sent the unaccounted-for social benefit of undeveloped green space,
however, antiproperty easements are scattered, creating transaction
costs, and thereby defending the initial allocation.
It is important to note that the mechanism of antiproperty ease
ments does not effect a first-best solution. Transaction costs do not go
away - on the contrary, new transaction costs are created. Also, anti
property easements do not lead to a full internalization of unac
counted-for benefits of undeveloped green space. Instead, the mecha
nism of antiproperty easements institutes transaction costs as a rough
counterbalance to the unaccounted-for benefits of conservation. Spe
cifically, these new rights we propose force developers to add substan
tial transaction costs to their balance sheet as a proxy for the currently
unaccounted-for component of public benefits from conservation.
Antiproperty easements are not capable - in themselves - of
creating a one-to-one correlation between the costs paid by developers
and the accurate benefits of the conservation foreclosed by develop
ment. Rather, decisionmakers should employ antiproperty easements
only where they conclude that the unaccounted-for public interest in
conservation is sufficiently large to warrant creating transaction costs
that make the status quo practically unassailable.
In our Oceanside example, the benefits from preservation are
often so small and dispersed that the cost of coordinating preservation
campaigns is prohibitive. Put differently, the high transaction costs
created by the widespread scattering of benefits produce a situation in
which it is often impossible for beneficiaries to ensure that their inter
ests in park preservation are taken into account by the political and
economic process. As we pointed out earlier, this means that without
legal intervention, inefficient development is a likely outcome. Practi
cally, however, there is no way to lower sufficiently transaction costs
(in this case, primarily the cost of coordination) on the beneficiaries'
side in order to produce an efficient market. Our proposal, therefore,
employs the next best option: shifting the transaction costs to the
other side by engendering a holdout problem.145
It is important to note that j ust such an arrangement was imple
mented in Chicago in order to protect Grant Park against develop
ment. After the city dedicated land for the park some 150 years ago,
the Illinois legislature enacted legislation providing that:
[a]ny person being the owner of or being interested in any lot, or part of
a lot, fronting on Michigan Avenue [abutting the park], shall have the
right to enjoin . . . all [] persons and corporations[] from any violation of
145. In Part IV.C, infra, we offer a first-best mechanism that incorporates antiproperty
easements and the takings power.
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the [non-encroachment] provisions of this section . . . and by bill or petition in chancery, . . . enforce the provisions of . . . this section, and recover such damages for any such encroachment or violation as the court
shall deem just.146

In a series of cases, the courts upheld abutting owners right to enjoin
development on dedicated park land.147
Antiproperty easements thus simultaneously aim at goals that are
considered the basis of property, and those that are ordinarily thought
of as antithetical to the property system. On the one hand, antiprop
erty easements, like ordinary property, curb overexploitation by forc
ing the internalization of costs. On the other hand, antiproperty ease
ments achieve this goal by deliberately creating a holdout problem a strategic problem that many commonly see as the bane of the prop
erty system.
E.

Public Choice and Antiproperty Rights

As we noted earlier, successful conservation policies must take into
account possible political failures that may undermine conservation
regimes. First and foremost, we should explain why political actors
may find it beneficial to implement our proposal. After all, one might
argue that the inherent predisposition of political actors to favor de
velopment should preempt any attempt at granting antiproperty rights
to private property owners. All the political shortcomings and political
difficulties we discussed earlier would simply carry over. As we show
in the proceeding paragraphs, however, the semblance of symmetry is
misleading. An antiproperty regime may often avoid the political fail
ures that plague ex post protection of green space and other conserva
tion properties.
First, it is important to recall that conservation regimes may
emerge from different levels of government. For example, our pro
posal may be adopted at the federal level, the state level, the county
level, or the municipal level. As William Fischel noted, the influence
of different interest groups varies among the different levels of
government.148 At some levels, prodevelopment interests may carry a
lot of clout, while at others their influence may be quite limited. Natu
rally, the same holds true for proconservation interests. The latter
group, however, will be abetted by an often sizable group of property
146. See City of Chicago v. Ward, 400 48 N.E. 927 (Ill. 1897).
147. The fascinating history of Grant Park is discussed in a series of cases known as the
Ward cases. See City of Chicago v. Ward, 48 N.E. 927; Bliss v. Ward, 64 N.E. 705 (Ill. 1902);
Ward v. Field Museum, 89 N.E. 73l (Ill. 1909); South Park Com'rs v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 93 N.E. 910 (Ill. 1911). See also McCormick v. Chicago Yacht Club, 163 N.E. 418 (Ill.
1928); Stevens Hotel Co. v. Chicago Yacht Club, 171 N. E. 550 (Ill. 1930).
148. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
100-40 (1995).
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owners who stand to gain from the enactment of the antiproperty
regime, which would increase the value of their realty. Therefore, it is
quite possible that the proconservation forces and their allies will win
the political battle at some level. Accordingly, such conservationists
may introduce an antiproperty regime in a congenial political arena in
order to block future losses on less congenial ground. Thus, the grant
of antiproperty rights represents a valuable precommitment strategy
for conservationists that will allow translating a one-time political vic
tory into a more permanent defense of conservation properties.149
Second, the coalitions forming around a decision to grant anti
property easements may create an entirely new political dynamic, at
any level of government. Antiproperty easements represent an identi
fiable good that will be distributed to an identifiable (and possibly
influential) group. The possibility of obtaining this good may rally
proximate-property owners into forming political pressure groups,
even where a one-time battle to save a park from a particular project
would not. Antiproperty regimes may thus create their own interest
group lobbyists to support conservation and battle anticonservation
lobbyists.
Third, and finally, the granting of antiproperty easements raises
the value of affected property by creating greater certainty about the
continued existence of the park. By means of property taxes, govern
ments can partly recapture this value. In a world where fiscal illusion
distorts government decisionmaking, this added marginal benefit in
favor of conservation may sometimes tip the scales.
III. ANTIPROPERTY AND THE THEORY OF THE COMMONS
Having described antiproperty easements as a potential solution to
the problem of mismanagement of publicly owned conservation re
sources, we now turn to the broader question of where to place anti
property within the broader context of the theory of property. As we
show, an antiproperty analysis introduces important changes to tradi
tional understandings of property theory, especially in the realm of
commons property.
Commons property regimes have long been of interest to property
theorists.150 Traditionally, theorists elaborated Hardin's central propo
sition: that commons property is likely to lead to overexploitation and
149. To be sure, development forces may similarly seek the high political ground, and
they too will try to parlay their victory there into a permanent structure in accordance with
their own precommitment strategy. The granting of antiproperty rights, however, is not a
tool that will assist such development forces. Moreover, as we note in Part IV, infra, if the
antiproperty regime is properly structured, even a successful confiscation of antiproperty
rights will not undermine optimal conservation.
150. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons. 1 10 YALE
L.J. 549, 559-60 (discussing commons property in an Aristotelian context).
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exhaustion of resources.151 Michael Heller adduced an important cor
ollary to Hardin's theory by pointing out that the opposite problem
could also arise.152 Heller showed that too many property rights too
widely dispersed may lead to underexploitation and underutilization
of resources.153 Citing the division of private property in the former
U.S.S.R. as an example, Heller demonstrated that too many owners
holding veto rights over property can lock the property into indefinite
suboptimal use, or even, no use at all.154 Heller aptly labeled this phe
nomenon "anticommons property."155 Paralleling Hardin, Heller de
scribed the "tragedy of the anticommons" as a peril to be averted, and
this view has since been accepted.156
Our proposed antiproperty easements present an important coun
terpoint. As Ellickson,157 and later Heller,158 noted, insofar as nonuse
is, at times, the optimal use of property, the scattering of property
rights - and the deliberate creation of anticommons and their atten
dant high transaction costs - is an important policy tool that ought to
be considered. Indeed, we suggest an addition to Heller's terminology
to reflect the fact that some anticommons are desirable; we propose
the name "conservation commons" for commons whose most efficient
use is nonuse.
Antiproperty, and its use in preserving conservation commons,
thus introduces two important innovations. First, antiproperty is a
quasiprivate mechanism for pursuing goals that are generally thought
to be paradigmatic public functions. Resource conservation through
antiproperty relies on private enforcement by interested private ac
tors, funded by costs imposed on private opponents of the public goal.
151. See Hardin. supra note 20; Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and
Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000); Bruce Yandle & Andrew P.
Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Trage
dies ofthe Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123 (2001).
152. Heller, The Tragedy ofthe Anticommons, supra note 21.
153. See id. at 673-77.
154. See id. at 633-59.
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 208, 208 n.3 (citing Heller's "tragedy of the anticommons"); James M. Buchanan &
Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 n.1
(2000) ; Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COM. L. 595, 613-614 (2002) (dis
cussing reunification mechanisms designed to overcome the problem of anticommons in
property law); Francesco Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The
Economics of New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 90 KY. L.J. 295, 310-15 (2001-2002) (discussing
the anticommons problem underlying the case of New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S.
483); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA.
L. REV. 875, 914 n.179 (citing Heller).
157. See Ellickson, supra note 23.
158. See Heller, The Tragedy ofthe Anticommons, supra note 21, at 668.
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As we will show, resource conservation effected in this way has impor
tant practical implications as well as theoretical ones. Antiproperty is a
flexible tool that may be used for conservation of assets or for
controlling the rate of their exploitation, by means of the market and
courts.159 The second advance embodied in antiproperty is a fleshing
out of a new category of entitlement - a veto entitlement that ensures
nonuse and nonexploitation by virtue of its part in an anticommons.
Translating Ellickson's and Heller's observations about potential vir
tues of anticommons into a comprehensive structure of antiproperty
demonstrates a concrete manner in which anticommons may be
exploited.
A.

Situating Antiproperty in Commons Theory

Studies of commons property have, quite naturally, focused on re
solving Hardin's tragedy of the commons. The traditional remedy is
privatization.160 If too many shepherds ruin the common pasture be
cause none has a sufficient pecuniary interest in the pasture's preser
vation, the difficulty can be easily resolved by giving ownership of the
pasture to one of the shepherds, or by dividing the pasture among
the several shepherds. Each shepherd can then be counted on to pro
tect her financial interest in the land by blocking overgrazing and
properly balancing the benefits of grazing against the costs of pasture
depletion.161
A second common remedy for the tragedy - often cited in the
field of environmental law - is regulation. For example, to prevent
shepherds from overgrazing the pasture, state regulators can limit
grazing hours, or the number of sheep with access to the field. Indeed,
regulation is an enormously popular remedy for commons abuse in
such diverse contexts as hunting,162 logging,163 and air164 and water
pollution.165 Yet, regulation has drawn its critics, as it is viewed ·as
cumbersome, costly, and inefficient.166
159. See infra Part IV.
160. See Hardin, supra note 20.
161. See Demsetz, supra note 34.
162. See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.
(1994) (regulating, inter alia, hunting on federal lands).
163. See, e.g. , National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 472a, 476, 500, 513-516,
521b, 576b, 1600-1602, 1604, 1606, 1608-1614 (2002); Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act,
16 u.s.c. § 528-31 (1994).
1 64. See, e.g. , Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2002).
165. See, e.g. , Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2002).
166. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Envi
ronmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins,
Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 , 8 (1991); Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Envi-
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In her groundbreaking work, Governing the Commons, Elinor
Ostrom demonstrated the possibility of a third remedy by highlighting
the importance of social norms in regulating the commons.167 Ostrom
observed that social norms may lower coordination and other transac
tion costs to such an extent that overexploitation will not occur, even
without fully privatizing the commons, or introducing an external gov
ernment regulator.168 On the basis of extensive empirical research,
Ostrom identified and categorized a number of different
public/private mechanisms that harness social norms to bridge the gap
between commons and ordinary private property.169
Ostrom recognized that her commons remedies were limited to
those situations in which the group accessing the commons was suffi
ciently small and cohesive that it could regulate its own members
through social norms. For example, Ostrom described public/private
commons regimes governing uncultivated lands near small Japanese
villages,170 Philippine irrigation communities,171 and several fisheries.172
Our strategy in proposing antiproperty approaches the problem
from a different angle. Like Ostrom, we seek to expand the possibili
ties of commons management beyond privatization and regulation.
We resolve the problem of overexploitation by creating a new public
private hybrid, along a different axis than that explored by Ostrom.
Ostrom described situations in which the many users of a commons
resource are yoked together by social norms and induced by social en
forcement mechanisms to engage in efficient use. Our aim, by con
trast, is not to achieve coordination among all affected users, but
rather to single out a select group of users, vest its members with
nonusary property rights, and use the resulting anticommons to deter
inefficient use. Importantly, at this stage, we do not expect this set of
users, or any cohesive group for that matter, to fully internalize the
costs and benefits associated with conservation of the resource. Yet,
we are able to attain the desired conservation by taking advantage of
strategic flaws inherent in certain transactional settings. An important
advantage of our mechanism is that it may be employed in situations
where neither a full-fledged regulatory scheme nor a scheme of
ronmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1998); James E. Krier, The Irrational Na
tional Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323 (1974);
Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985).
167. OSTROM, supra note 31.
168. See id. at 18-21.
1 69. See id.
170. See id. at 65-69.
171. See id. at 82-88.
172. See id. at 144-78. Ostrom noted that several of the fisheries were unsuccessful in
maintaining reliable governing commons regimes.
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private property rights is feasible, and in which it is practically impos
sible to lower transaction costs, even through social norms.
The relative advantages and disadvantages of each commons gov
ernance scheme - and the situations in which each is desirable - are
illustrated in the following table:
TABLE

Privatization

I. COMMONS GOVERNANCE

Transac-

Group Size

Monitoring

Share in

Potential

tion Costs

and Cohe-

and Enforce-

Resource

Drawbacks

siveness

ment

Small, Low

Low, Private

Low

Irrelevant

Negative
Externalities

Government

High

Large, Low

High, Public

Irrelevant

Administrative Rent-

Regulation

Seeking and
Capture
Low

Social

Small, High

High, Private

Norms

Roughly

Negative

Equal

Externalities;
Limited
Coverage

Antiproperty

High

Large, Low

Low, Private

One Special

Limited Use

Interest
Group

As the table suggests, antiproperty provides an important policy
tool that outperforms its more well-known cousins in certain settings.
1.

Privatization

Privatization works best when transaction costs are sufficiently low
to allow resources to gravitate through market transactions to their
highest-value users. Private property lowers monitoring costs, as the
owner need not monitor compliance by other users of the property,
and only has to guard the property against incursions by others.173
Group size and cohesiveness among group members are not prerequi
sites for establishing private property regimes. As group size rises and
cohesiveness diminishes, however, transaction costs are likely to
increase as well, making private property regimes increasingly
173. See Ellickson, supra note 23.
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unwieldy.174 It is important to note that private property does not
eliminate all externalities. Private property schemes are flexible with
regard to the allocation of entitlements; nothing demands that all
property owners receive equal shares in the commons. Yet, private
property regimes rarely achieve a full accounting of costs among
property owners.175 Generally, some negative externalities of property
use escape full accounting, creating the need for some external regula
tory mechanism such as tort (primarily nuisance) or explicit govern
ment regulation.
2.

Regulation

Regulation is a standard response to various market failures. When
markets produce socially suboptimal results, the government is
expected to supplement market mechanisms, or even to supplant them
altogether in order to remedy deficiencies.176 In the extreme, the
regulator is supposed to set up optimal standards for behavior (e.g.,
emission quotas), monitor compliance, and prosecute violators.177
Group size is not an inherent limitation on regulatory schemes, but the
cost of monitoring is likely to rise with group size. Monitoring and
enforcement are typically performed by government agencies that are
set up precisely for this purpose. Naturally, this requires the regulator
to have adequate information and expertise for the task.
Regulatory schemes suffer from two major flaws. First, regulators
are not themselves market participants, and they lack a direct interest
in the outcomes they seek to protect. Regulators are therefore suscep
tible to being captured by their "clients, " who may promise the
administrators better working conditions (through the appearance of
compliance) or future benefits (such as postgovernment work in the
industry).178 Regulators may also seek to protect their own jobs by
instituting unnecessary regulations to foment busywork and adminis-

174. See Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 21.
175. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 4-6 (2d ed.
1997 ).
1 76. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Towards Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1495, 1504 (advocating the correction of market failures through the enforcement of
environmental rights); Michael A Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a
Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 926 (1990) (describing gov
ernment response to such suboptimal problems as free-riding).
177. See Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 550 (1979) (discussing the theory that gov
ernment regulation solves problems in unregulated markets).
178. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
672 (2000) (discussing the interdependence of private and public actors).
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trative "creep."179 Additionally, regulators often lack direct access to
information necessary for monitoring, and must therefore rely upon
their clients to supply the very information needed to limit the clients'
behavior; to say the least, this creates a potential conflict of interest.180
Finally, as regulators benefit a particular set of clients, they are likely
to create a dynamic of adverse selection, in which the regulators and
clients develop increasingly cozy relationships at the expense of the
public at large.181 A second, related flaw is the high cost of government
regulation. Perhaps due to the regulators' attenuated relationship to
the subject of their work and to the ubiquity of administrative rent
seeking, full-fledged regulatory schemes tend to be enormously more
expensive than allocative techniques that use the market.182
3.

Social Norms

One of Ostrom's most important contributions to the commons lit
erature was positive, rather than normative. In her empirical study,
Ostrom observed numerous commons - or common-pool resources,
in her terminology - that managed to avoid overexploitation despite
minimal government regulation, and notwithstanding the fact that the
commons had not been divided among private property owners.183
Ostrom attributed the preservation to social norms.
Ostrom noted, however, that such norms could only be successful
in governing commons under the limited circumstances in which re
source users could be expected to obey social norms, i.e., where users
constitute a small and cohesive group, with roughly equal shares in the
resource.184 Absent the small size or cohesiveness, resource users
would expect to evade social sanctions, and they could safely ignore
the social norms and over-exploit the commons. The utility of social
norm-enforced commons governance is further restricted by high
monitoring costs among the group of resource users. Like the privati179. See Ernest Gellhom & Paul Yerkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1004 (1999) (acknowledging the process of "creeping" as asserting
jurisdiction without authority).
180. David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Ra
tional Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 927 n.29 (2001). On cap
ture theory, see generally, WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTA
TIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); and Stigler, supra note 56.
181. See Johnston, supra note 15, at 145.
182. See Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political
Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1460-61 (2002) (de
scribing the expense of policymaking by rulemaking for an administrative agency); Jonathan
B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE
L.J. 677, 704-35 (1999).
183. See OSTROM, supra note 31.
184. Id.
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zation remedy, governance of commons through social norms effects
internalization of costs only among users (or owners, in the case of
privatization), and does not block the creation of negative external
ities. Such externalized costs are left to such devices as tort law or
government regulation.
4.

A ntiproperty

Governance of the commons through antiproperty mechanisms is
recommended when: (1) transaction costs are high ( and consequently,
private ordering cannot be relied on to achieve the socially desirable
outcome ) ; (2) effective social norms are unlikely to develop on
account of group size and lack of cohesiveness; (3) regulation is either
excessively costly or impractical due to inadequate information; and
(4) the ideal management of the commons involves complete or stag
gered conservation. When these conditions obtain, antiproperty pro
vides an attractive alternative to the traditional means of commons
governance as it involves negli"gible set-up costs, requires little infor
mation, and is self-enforcing.
Moreover, antiproperty protection of commons generates positive
externalities to the public at large. This is due to the peculiar nature of
this regime as rights delivered to those especially benefited on behalf
of a larger group of beneficiaries. The protection of the interest of the
larger public comes at no additional cost to the easement holders, but
rather stems from the dispersion of rights and the concomitant coordi
nation costs imposed upon would-be developers.
B.

Utilizing A ntiproperty to Govern Conservation Commons

The practical usefulness of antiproperty as a regulatory tool stems
from three factors. First, antiproperty is a privately owned entitle
ment, protected through the ordinary legal system. If an interloper
begins undesired development on the protected property, owners of
the antiproperty entitlements will have recourse to law enforcement
and the courts to enforce their rights. The executive organs of the
state, by contrast, will be able to stand aside, and permit the ordinary
legal process to block the undesired development. Owners of anti
property rights are likely to oversee their own property and bear the
responsibility of enforcing their entitlements. Antiproperty therefore
presents decisionmakers with a conservation tool whose cost is not
borne by the public purse.
Second, antiproperty places the duty to monitor on those actors
who already have the best access to information about the protected
resources and can perform this task at the least cost. The surrounding
property owners are in constant contact with the protected green
space; indeed, it is this contact that produces for them the special
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value they attach to the park. For these neighbors, collecting informa
tion about the green space is a natural byproduct of their daily activi
ties and creates no marginal cost.
Third, shifting attention to the benefit side, antiproperty rights are
vested in precisely those persons who have the greatest interest in
protecting the endangered resource. The easement holders are se
lected on the basis of a pecuniary interest in the park that sets them
apart from the public. The addition of antiproperty easements, there
fore, compounds their incentive to protect the integrity of green
spaces in court.
It is worth stressing that while our proposal involves a hybrid of
public and private rights, the combination is uniquely suited to preser
vation of conservation commons. The public-private hybrid we devise
rests on combining different types of nonpossessory property rights
vested in different actors. In addition, the privileged group members
are not entitled, by law, to any special use benefits. Nor can they ex
clude outsiders from enjoying the benefits produced by conservation.
Hence, the term "antiproperty."
The three most important rights in the "property bundle" are the
right to exclude, the right to use, and the right to transfer.185 Antiprop
erty easements are nonpossessory, practically inalienable, and confer
no special-use rights. In addition, insofar as they are exclusive (only of
developers), this attribute is necessary to achieve a predominantly in
clusive regime in which the general public may very well enjoy the
lion's share of benefits. Thus, while the easements may technically
be classified as property - mainly because of the almost infinite
flexibility of the term186 - they are better viewed collectively as
"antiproperty."
The extant commons literature has hitherto focused primarily on
possessory and usary rights in commons. This focus has limited the
analysis to three paradigmatic cases: (a) private ownership and private
regulation; (b) common ownership and public regulation; and (c)
common ownership and private regulation. We show, however, that
conservation commons may be preserved with hybrids of both owner
ship and regulation. In our paradigmatic case, private antiproperty
rights work alongside common ownership, and private market dy
namics supplement public decisionmaking. This reshuffling of the
traditional elements of commons analysis produces an ironic but
highly desirable result. By employing private nonpossessory entitle-

185. For discussion of the "bundle of rights" theory of property, see generally,
LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 11-21 (1977);
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22-36 (1990); WALDRON, supra note 19, at

47-53, 59-60.
186. See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1519-20 (2003).
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ments, decisionmakers ensure limited open access commons,187 and
guarantee equal use rights to all members of the public regardless of
their proximity to the park.
C.

The Hidden Virtues of Transaction Costs

A key component of our proposal is the deliberate creation of
transaction costs - generally considered the bane of efficiency - in
order to remedy inefficiencies in the market for conservation. Two
notes about this strategy are in order. First, we are aware of the dan
gers inherent in using transaction costs as a proxy for unaccounted for
public benefits of conservation. There is no direct correlation between
the two values, and inaccurate estimates of the two figures could lead
to too much conservation. Therefore, it is imperative to introduce
flexibility into antiproperty easements - a challenge we address head
on in the next Part.
Second, it is worth mentioning other contexts in which transaction
costs have been used as a proxy in remedying market failures. For in
stance, the National Environmental Protection Act ("NEPA") re
quires environmental-impact statements to be produced for many
public projects.188 As interpreted by the courts, NEPA's requirement is
mainly procedural. The relevant agency must fully examine environ
mental impacts and issue a report; if the report is found inadequate by
the courts, the agency need only study the impact further, and produce
a new report.189 Yet, many environmental protection advocates have
hailed the substantive effects of NEPA.190 One possible way of under187. In principle, the resource is subject to open access. As we explained, inclusion of
the public at large lies at the heart of antiproperty regimes. We add the "limited" proviso
strictly because uses inconsistent with conservation, such as undesired development, are
excluded.
188. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (2002).
189. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 921 (2002) (noting
that neither the statute nor the courts have imposed a minimum adequate standard on
NEPA with regard to environmental assessments).
190. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Implementing NEPA: A Non-Technical Political Task, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTURE 25, 26 (Ray Clark &
Larry Canter eds., 1997); Karkkainen, supra note 189, at 970; William H. Rodgers, Jr., The
Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: "The Whats", 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 31 ("The most admired of all the environmental laws is the NEPA. It is admired for
its form, its structure, and its robustness. It is praised for its eloquence of formulation and for
the cleverness in the way it was attached to existing agency mandates. It has been emulated
by a hundred other initiatives. It is celebrated for any number of paradigm shifts - from
simple public policy evaluation to impact assessment to comprehensive rationality to eco
logical experimentation to public participation to integrated decisionmaking. "). But see Jo
seph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239 (1973) ("I
know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation, detailed findings
or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of the administrative decisions. I
think the emphasis on the redemptive quality of procedural reform is about nine parts myth
and one part coconut oil.").
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standing these effects is as the result of transaction costs. NEPA cre
ates reporting costs for would-be-developers as a proxy for the
unaccounted-for public interest in environmental protection, and
these costs deter certain projects at the margin. 1 91 Naturally, this is a
very rough proxy, as there is no inherent correspondence between the
costs of reporting and the magnitude of the public interest.
Finally, our antiproperty proposal thus far, based as it is on creat
ing holdout problems through the generation of transaction costs, cre
ates only a second-best solution to the problem of preserving conser
vation commons. Our mechanism does not lead the relevant parties
(developers, neighbors, et al. ) to internalize fully the benefits and costs
of conservation and development. Rather, it leads to efficient results
on the assumption that decisionmakers have correctly identified the
commons as one whose ideal "use" is conservation. As we show in the
next Part, a first-best solution is attainable when antiproperty ease
ments are combined with another key element in the law of entitle
ments: the takings power.
IV.

ANTIPROPERTY AND ENTITLEMENT THEORY

Thus far, we have introduced the concept of antiproperty ease
ments, situated it within property theory, and demonstrated its norma
tive appeal as a policy tool. A seeming challenge we have eluded so far
is flexibility. To be sure, circumstances change, and conservation that
was desirable at one time may be less so at another. Indeed, it is for
this reason that property law disfavors permanent limitations on
alienability, 1 92 and provides tools like the power of eminent domain for
overcoming holdout problems. 193 In this Part, we show that antiprop
erty can be combined with other powers such as eminent domain in
order to create regimes that are sensitive to change. Indeed, we show
that when the takings power is added to the picture, the mechanism of
antiproperty easements can lead to first-best outcomes for the preser
vation of conservation commons, giving policymakers two innovative
191. Likewise, Thomas Merrill has argued for a "due process tax" to deter the govern
ment from using its takings power excessively. See Merrill, Public Use, supra note 136, at 7781. The gist of the proposal is to insist that "courts strictly enforce procedural limitations on
the exercise of eminent domain." DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS w. MERRILL, PROPERTY:
TAKINGS 205 (2002). Implementing this proposal would increase the cost of takings for the
government, and ensure that the eminent domain power is only used "where the surplus to
the taker is greater than the due process tax." Id. at 206.
192. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant
to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. REV. 751, 755
(1988) (viewing the restraints on alienability with disfavor); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER,
supra note 14, at 227 (explaining the objections to restraints on alienation).
193. See, e.g. , Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2112 (1987) (resorting to eminent domain when hold
outs prevent voluntary transactions).
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approaches for dealing with the conservation challenge: a
second-best and a first-best mechanism.
Our second-best mechanism is a private mechanism, predicated on
voluntary transacting, which preserves parks and green spaces as un
developed conservation commons. Our first-best mechanism requires
government mediation or delegation, through the power of eminent
domain. While the first-best mechanism allows for development of
certain parkland, it guarantees that such development will only occur
when it is efficient.
To demonstrate the flexibility and utility of antiproperty, we con
nect antiproperty to our previous work,194 and place it within the
broader frameworks of entitlement theory and the law of takings. We
begin by reviewing Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's famous
model of property rules and liability rules.195
A. Flexible A ntiproperty and Pliability Rules
Calabresi and Melamed's classic model divides the world of enti
tlements into three types of protection: property rules, liability rules,
and inalienability rules.196 Entitlements protected by property rules
may only be taken with the consent of the entitlement owner, allowing
owners to determine the price of their entitlement.197 Liability-rule
protection, by contrast, allows potential takers to avail themselves of
other people's entitlements as long as they are willing to pay a collec
tively determined price that is usually set by a court, a legislator, or an
administrative agency.198 Inalienability rules bar transfer of the enti
tlement altogether.199 The differences between the rules may be illus
trated with reference to the celebrated case of Boomer v. A tlantic
Cement Co.200 In Boomer, homeowners near Atlantic Cement's manu
facturing plant complained that the plant's pollution gave rise to an
actionable nuisance, and sought to enforce their property rule protec
tion with an injunction that would close down the plant. The court,
however, decided to grant the homeowners only liability-rule protec
tion, permitting the plant to continue operations, subject to the pay
ment of permanent damages to the homeowners.201
194. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 27; Bell & Parchomovsky, Pliability
Rules, supra note 28; Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, supra note 26.
195. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
201. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 875.

50

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 102:1

The three forms identified by Calabresi and Melamed may be
joined by a fourth variety. Entitlements are often protected by amal
gamated "pliable" protection that incorporates elements of both
property and liability-rule protection.202 Pliability, or pliable, rules are
contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with property- or
liability-rule protection as long as some specified condition obtains;
once the relevant condition changes, however, a different rule protects
the entitlement - either liability or property, as the circumstances dic
tate.203 For example, in Boomer, the court might have employed a two
stage rule of liability-rule protection followed by property-rule protec
tion. The court could have achieved this by issuing an injunction that
would block the plant's operation, but would take effect only in, say,
ten years. In the meantime, the plant could continue operations in ex
change for the payment of damages to the homeowners.204
Pliability rules are flexible tools; the shift between different stages
of rule protection may be triggered by time (as in our Boomer
example), changed circumstances, magnitude or nature of use of the
entitlement, or a combination of these factors.205 For our purposes, the
importance of pliable rules lies in their ability to contain built-in limi
tations on property-rule protection.
As we have described antiproperty easements thus far, they are en
titlements formally defended by property-rule protection and substan
tively governed by an inalienability regime.206 Indeed, each owner is
empowered to set a price for transferring her easements; and that
power creates the holdout dynamic that in turn makes each owner's
easement effectively inalienable. Decisionmakers may not want a con
servation regime to govern a commons forever, however.207 In such
cases, the antiproperty easements could be given the characteristics of
pliability-rule protection.
For instance, antiproperty easements may be used to delay or stag
ger development, rather than to block it forever. To accomplish this,
decisionmakers may impose a time limit on the antiproperty ease
ments. Upon the passage of the specified time the easements would
expire and the barrier to the development of the commons would be
alleviated. Assume, for example, that decisionmakers in the town of
202. Bell & Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, supra note 28.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Supra, Parts 11.C-III.
207. Cf Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Fu
ture, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 744 (2002) (cautioning that, due to their binding effect on future
generations, conservation easements "may further the interests of members of the present
generation at the expense of future generations"). We discuss conservation easements fur
ther in Part V.B.3, infra.
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Evergreen Park, Illinois foresee a possibility that in twenty years, the
downtown commons currently used as a park will be more efficiently
used as commercial and residential space. In order to ease the transi
tion, and protect the commons in the meantime, Evergreen Park can
issue twenty-year antiproperty easements to nearby neighbors of the
commons. Pliability-oriented antiproperty easements thus create an
option not only for conserving environmentally valuable resources,
but also for regulating the speed of development.
An alternative pliability-oriented antiproperty easement could
follow up the formal property-rule stage with liability-rule protection.
These antiproperty easements would require the consent of easement
owners for transfer of the easements in the first stage. In response to
changed circumstances, or some other trigger, however, the easements
would enjoy only liability-rule protection. This would allow developers
to build upon the affected green space in exchange for the payment of
damages to easement owners. Returning to our previous example, to
allow development and simultaneously compensate affected nearby
neighbors, Evergreen Park could issue perpetual antiproperty ease
ments which would only enjoy property-rule protection for twenty
years. Thereafter, others could use the protected property without the
consent of the easement holders, so long as they pay damages in the
amount stipulated by the municipality or the court. The shift to a
liability-rule regime eliminates the holdout problem and reintroduces
full alienability to the easements.
Decisionmakers can use the same design to adapt the easements to
unforeseeably changed circumstances as they occur. For example, over
time, owing to demographic changes, there is a danger that a city park
could become a magnet for illegal drug transactions, and, therefore, a
nuisance to proximate-property owners. To counter this threat, deci
sionmakers could stipulate that if there are over a certain number of
arrests for serious crimes in the park in any given time period, the
easements would terminate.
The above examples demonstrate that antiproperty easements do
not have to be constructed to lock resources in their undeveloped state
in perpetuity. Rather, antiproperty easements are an adaptable tool,
sensitive to changing circumstances, that may be used in numerous
ways by decisionmakers to promote various policy goals. A final ex
ample illustrates how antiproperty easements may be useful for en
suring no net loss of green space within a given region. Again, the key
to achieving this policy lies in the use of a pliability mechanism.
Rather than starting the liability phase upon the passage of a certain
period of time, decisionmakers could stipulate a different triggering
event: liability protection would begin once a potential taker of the
easement aggregated within her possession alternate green space of
greater volume than the green space she proposed to develop. For
instance, if Concrete Jungle wished to convert forty acres of protected
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green space into a factory, it could trigger the shift to liability protec
tion by purchasing more than forty acres of space elsewhere, and dedi
cating them to conservation by distributing antiproperty easements to
nearby neighbors of the new location.208
B.

A ntiproperty, Takings, and Givings

The government's power of eminent domain, also known as its
takings power, is seen as the quintessential means for government to
overcome strategic problems in the property market.209 Where it finds
the necessity to do so, the government may avoid the ordinary market
for property. Instead, it may employ its power to take property, so
long as it abides by the constitutional requirement that it pay "just
compensation," i.e., the property's fair market value.210
Technically, the Constitution adds a further requirement before an
act of eminent domain: the taking must be for a "public use."211 In
practice, however, courts find any purpose as "public use" for consti
tutional purposes.212 The takings power thus remains almost bound
less. Indeed, the government often uses its takings power to assemble
properties for private interests; sometimes, it even delegates its power
of eminent domain to private actors.213
208. In citing this example, we do not intimate that either "no net loss" or "permanent
conservation" is a preferred strategy; implementing a no-net-loss policy for green space
could involve some difficult legal and factual determinations. Decisionmakers might profit
from examining the experience of the federal no-net-loss policy for wetlands. For a discus
sion of some of the issues that have arisen, see, for example, Michael C. Blurnm, The Clinton
Wetlands Plan: No Net Gain in Wetlands Protection, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203 (1994),
and S. Scott Burkhalter, Comment, Oversimplification: Value and Function: Wetland Mitiga
tion Banking, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 261 (1999).
209. See Merrill, Public Use, supra note 136, at 65 (arguing that the purpose of eminent
domain is to facilitate transactions that would not occur voluntarily); Glen 0. Robinson, On
Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1 177, 1 192 (2002) (explaining how the
government negates the ability of owners to free-ride through the use of eminent domain);
Rose, supra note 32, at 750 (describing the anti-holdout rationale for the building of public
roads and waterways).
210. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using Eminent
Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1816
(1995) (explaining landowners' entitlement to just compensation); Michael H. Schill, Inter
governmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
829, 896 (1989) (justifying the use of fair market value to calculate just compensation).
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("(N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judici
ary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49 (1998) (call
ing for reinterpreting the Takings Clause to reduce private rent-seeking).
212. See Merrill, Public Use, supra note 136, at 63 (characterizing the history of eminent
domain as one of extreme deference); Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and
Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 410 (1983) (acknowledging that
the requirement for public use has relaxed considerably).
213. See Abraham Bell, Private Takings (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 979
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The power of eminent domain thus provides a potential escape
route for developers seeking to evade the restrictions on conservation
commons created by antiproperty easements. Developers can use their
superior political power to persuade decisionmakers to seize all the
relevant easements, thereby permitting development. In the case of a
taking, the government would be required to pay just compensation to
the easement holders. Nothing in the current law would require the
developer to reimburse the public fisc for this expense, or for the value
it will be given, however.214 Moreover, neither the government nor the
developer would have to make any payment to conservation benefici
aries lacking property interests. Thus, from the developer's viewpoint,
the process would not pose any substantial additional deterrent to in
efficient development.215 Furthermore, the holdout dynamic would not
pose a barrier to the development, since easement owners would not
be able to block the government taking. Worse yet, since the easement
holders would be fully compensated, they would have very little incen
tive to lobby against the inefficient development. This means that the
public's interest in conservation would receive no representation in
the case of a taking.
Preventing takings from undermining the entire regime of conser
vation commons requires two important steps. First, decisionmakers
must close the loophole in the law of takings which allows private
beneficiaries to enjoy taken property while compensation is paid from
the public purse. Developers - the beneficiaries of the act of eminent
domain - must be forced to pay the just compensation out of their
own pockets, or to reimburse the government for the value of the giv
ings they receive (i.e., the fair market value of the easements). Second,
the magnitude of the compensation, or the charge for the giving, must
be made to reflect the interests of the wider public that enjoys the
park. This may be accomplished either by applying a multiplier to the
compensation that must be paid per easement, or by adding an addi
tional easement that represents the public interest. These two meas-

(2000) [hereinafter Merrill, Constitutional Property] (analyzing the effects of delegating the
power of eminent domain); Merrill, Public Use, supra note 136, at 75 (describing the building
of an oil pipeline where only one feasible route exists); cf In re Condemnation of 1 10
Washington St., 767 A.2d 1154, 1 159 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (holding that power of eminent
domain "may not be delegated by agreement or contract").
214. In Givings, we noted the inefficient decisions produced by the failure to require
recipients of government largesse a fair charge for the giving parallel to the compensation
they would be paid were their property taken. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 27,
at 553. To be sure, a full givings regime would require charging not just the developers, but
also the nearby neighbors who initially receive the antiproperty easements.
215. If the political process placed a greater price on takings than on permitting devel
opment, the necessity of resorting to eminent domain would pose a real barrier to the devel
opers. Our model, however, has thus far assumed that political decisions are made in accor
dance with the magnitude of campaign contributions, rather than according to a pay scale
depending on the nature of the act.
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ures would lead would-be developers to internalize the cost of their
actions, and pave the way for development only where its benefits
truly outweighed the costs. Each of these elements warrants further
explanation.
Requiring the developers to compensate easement holders would
force them to account for the cost of the proposed development, and
thus, would serve as an internalization mechanism. Legally, this result
may be achieved in one of two ways. The government may delegate its
takings power to a private developer - as it sometimes does in the
case of utility companies216 - and mandate that the developer pay
compensation to affected easement holders. Alternatively, the gov
ernment could execute the taking itself, but require the developer who
benefits from the act to reimburse it for the amount paid in just com
pensation. Importantly, in order to make the easements effective, the
government must specify in the easements that they may only be taken
in one of these two ways.
Forcing developers to pay compensation to easement holders
would not lead them to fully internalize the cost of development, how
ever, since they would still ignore the cost to the wider public that en
j oys use of the park. Thus, the second important step in preventing
takings from undermining the conservation commons regime involves
forcing developers to take account of this cost component. To accom
plish this, the government can either use a multiplier to increase the
compensation award to each easement holder in order to reflect the
proportionate share of the public value lost.217 The drawback of this
solution is that it creates an agency problem. Knowing that they would
be compensated above and beyond their private loss, the easement
holders may conspire with developers to bring about inefficient or
premature development. Therefore, the proportion of the compensa
tion reflecting the public loss should be transferred to a pro
conservation organization, i.e., a body whose utility from preserving
the park would exceed any likely compensation to be paid, or one
required by charter to exercise a fiduciary duty to protect the public's
interest in preservation. Alternatively, decisionmakers could award an

216. See Merrill, Constitutional Property, supra note 213, at 979 (citing the example of
delegation of eminent domain to a private utility prior to the creation of the Tennessee Val
ley Authority); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of
the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 898 (1996) (discussing the delegation of the
power of eminent domain to railroads and utilities). See generally Bell, supra note 213.
217. For example, if each easement is worth $5,000, there are 100 easement holders, and
the public value/private value ratio is 1 , then each easement holder would receive $10,000 in
compensation. That is, the multiplier is 2 in this case.
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additional antiproperty easement that represents the public interest218
to a conservation organization to become effective upon a taking.219
Of course, a government-mediated takings process will not be
costless for developers. The urge to take easements through eminent
domain will not spontaneously materialize, and the political burden
will rest on the developers to produce the funds to move the political
process forward. This has the potential of producing substantial trans
action costs that would block efficient development if developers also
had to pay the full takings compensation discussed here. This distor
tion is substantially mitigated, however, by the likely reduction in
political opposition produced by the payment of compensation. While
there will be some owners whose subjective attachment to their ease
ments will make them dissatisfied by the compensation award, many
will be satisfied with the compensation paid. Even those who find the
compensation inadequate will find the margin of their disappointment
less than if the park was destroyed without compensation. And some
owners may actually find that they prefer the compensation to the
easement. Overall, it is quite likely that the compensation regime will
substantially reduce public opposition to development, which should
help reduce the developer's costs in the political arena. Indeed, in
cases in which full compensation makes easement holders indifferent
between conservation and development, so that no lobbying occurs,
the takings framework may open the way to a market solution unaf
fected by the distortions of the political process.
C.

A First-Best Solution

The takings framework introduces a possibility for attaining a first
best solution for the conservation problem. By using the takings power
in combination with antiproperty easements, a legal regime may
emerge in which developers will fully internalize the costs and benefits
218. This easement would technically be classified as a negative easement in gross, but
would otherwise partake of the qualities of the antiproperty easements granted to
proximate-property owners.
219. For simplicity's sake, we have assumed away, in the foregoing discussion, the many
practical problems that would likely accompany any attempt to ascertain the magnitude of
"just compensation" for antiproperty easements. While such compensation ordinarily re
flects the fair market value of the property, in this case there is not likely to be a market for
antiproperty rights, making it difficult to establish a baseline. Measuring the fluctuations in
property values before and after the granting of antiproperty easements might provide such
a benchmark. This, however, would not take account of the fact that even before the grant
ing of the formal easements, nearby neighbors likely benefited from de facto easements. A
taking, on the other hand, should prompt compensation for the full value of the property;
thus, full compensation would rightly include not only the value of the formal easement, but
that of the de facto easement as well. Cf Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, Optimal Allo
cation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem, 45 ECONOMETRICA 783
(1977) (proposing mechanism for revealing preferences of consumers of public goods despite
absence of market).
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of their actions, leading them to press forward with development only
when it is socially desirable. This possibility stems from the develop
ers' payment of full compensation. The compensation reflects the
value of the antiproperty easements, as well as the wider public
interest, making the outlay a good measurement of the social benefit
produced by the park. Naturally, on the other side of the cost-benefit
equation, developers already take into account the profits they expect
to earn from a given development project. Thus, once compensation is
properly calibrated, developers will move forward only when
proposed development produces a net social gain.
In a sense, the compensation that developers must pay for taking
antiproperty easements may be seen as "Pigovian taxes" that lead to
full internalization.220 This may be seen graphically below.
1.

No Efficient Development

Our first graph illustrates the economics of development for a sin
gle firm in a competitive market where no development would be the
most efficient outcome.

220. "Pigovian taxes are charges for units of an activity that are intended to internalize
external costs and thereby bring actors' decisions closer to social optimality." Henry E.
Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 654
n.1 1 (2000) .
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I.

DEVELOPMENT WITH AND WITHOUT INTERNALIZATION - NO
EFFICIENT DEVELOPMENT

MC

p

MC'

Q*

Q'

Q

The graph shows the cost function of a possible development com
pany - which we will call Development, Inc. The marginal cost to so
ciety of building up a given quantity of area out of parkland is shown
by the curve MC. This value includes not only the cost of construction,
but also the opportunity costs of retiring the park from public use. The
marginal cost borne by Development, Inc. for building up a given
area, however, is shown by curve MC'. As can be seen, Development,
Inc. need bear only a portion of the marginal societal cost; for any unit
produced, the cost borne by Development, Inc. is lower than that
borne by society. Finally, the marginal revenue earned by Develop
ment, Inc. for built-up area is shown by the line MR
which appears
as a straight line, since we are assuming that there is a competitive
market for developed property, making Development, Inc. conform to
the price of the market. The marginal revenue thus represents the
price at which Development, Inc. can sell each additional unit of built
up area.
In this situation, Development, Inc. is likely to produce the quan
tity Q' of built-up area, since any more than this quantity would pro
duce a marginal loss for Development, Inc., and any smaller output
would fail to capture all the profits that could be made by the com-
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pany. This output is far greater than the socially optimal output, how
ever. Indeed, the desirable amount of development in the situation il
lustrated in the graph is 0, shown as Q*. This is due to the fact that if
all the social costs were taken into account, the marginal cost of each
unit of development would always exceed the marginal revenue pro
duced by that development.
Using our earlier terminology, this case is one of a conservation
commons. The most efficient use of this area is conservation (i.e., non
building) . Since Development, Inc. needs to absorb only some of the
costs of building, however, it will undertake inefficient building. In
such a case, the holdout dynamic produced by distributing antiprop
erty rights will produce the efficient result. The existence of antiprop
erty rights will block all development - in this case, all inefficient de
velopment.
The availability of a takings option does not change this result. In
order to take the antiproperty easements that block development, De
velopment, Inc. would have to pay just compensation. This would
force Development, Inc. to bear fully the costs of its development. In
such a situation, the company will act as if its cost curve is MC rather
than MC'. Thus, Development, Inc. will avoid all development, since
no development will be cost effective.
2.

Efficient Development

In our earlier example, we assumed that there was no efficient de
velopment. Antiproperty rights alone thus produced the efficient re
sult. Situations may be hypothesized, however, where some develop
ment is efficient. In such situations, the takings regime, when
combined with antiproperty rights, leads to full internalization and
better outcomes, as demonstrated in the following graph.
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II.

DEVELOPMENT WITH AND WITHOUT INTERNALIZATION - SOME
EFFICIENT DEVELOPMENT

p

Q*

Q*
(new)

Q'

Q'
(new)

Q

This figure shares the assumptions from the previous illustration,
with one exception. The price that can be received from selling built
up area developed from the park is higher; consequently, Develop
ment, Inc. can expect to receive greater marginal revenue from each
unit built. This higher marginal revenue is represented by the line
labeled "MR (new)"; the marginal revenue in our previous example is
labeled "MR (old)" for illustrative purposes. One can imagine that the
change in marginal revenue results from an increase in the price of
housing, or that the marginal revenue figures differ because the
building is in different areas. The other curves - MC and MC' should be familiar from the previous example.
Given the new expected marginal revenue, Development, Inc. 's
decisions will change. Absent the internalization produced by a tak
ings regime in combination with antiproperty rights, Development,
Inc. will fail to take into account costs borne by the public, and it will
build the quantity specified by the intersection of MC' and MR (new),
i.e., Q' (new). Much of the development at the level of Q' (new), how
ever, is excessive and reflects Development, Inc.'s failure to fully
account for development costs. Once the company is forced to take
note of the full social cost of development, it will act as if its marginal
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cost curve is MC, rather than MC'. This will lead Development, Inc. to
produce the much smaller quantity of Q* (new), meaning that more
parkland will be preserved. Because this calculation takes into account
the full costs and benefits for society, Q* (new) is also the efficient
amount of building for society.
Notably, this result can be reached only with the full internaliza
tion produced by a takings regime that requires payment of full com
pensation for seized antiproperty easements. Were antiproperty
easements to be distributed without the possibility of subsequent tak
ings, the likely outcome would be no building at all. In this situation,
that would be an inefficient result.
V.

DISCUSSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

In this Part, we discuss some potential objections to an antiprop
erty regime and compare our proposal to potential alternatives. We
begin by examining the likely social outcomes of introducing an anti
property regime, focusing on whether granting antiproperty rights
should be seen as objectionable on distributive grounds. We then ad
dress the question of whether antiproperty regimes are superior to
their potential competitors. Among our important points of reference
here are the public-trust doctrine, the doctrine of environmental
standing, and conservation easements. After comparing the various
alternatives, we specify the conditions under which each policy tool
should be used, thereby providing a comprehensive menu for land use
policy that takes account of conservation goals.
A. Social Impacts ofAntiproperty Regimes
1.

Distributional Effects

On the surface, the distribution of antiproperty easements seems
to raise concerns about distributive j ustice, since the proposal involves
the transfer of rights over public property to private hands that
already gain unusual benefit from that property. Yet, a closer look
shows that our proposal has quite desirable distributive effects. While
it focuses on certain property owners and enhances the value of their
properties, it also bestows direct benefits on the public at large. This
result is enabled by the fact that antiproperty easements do not
diminish the access and use rights of third parties; they only serve to
impede development. Thus, the recipients of antiproperty easements
also become "trustees" for the public at large, which otherwise lacks a
dependable way to protect its share in a public good.
Simultaneously, formalizing antiproperty easements places the cost
of conservation on those who receive particular benefits. In the case of
Central Park, for example, the affluent owners of luxury housing bear
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the burden of preserving open space for all citizens. Perversely, per
haps, our analysis enhances the wealth of the general public by recog
nizing property rights in the most affluent members of our society.
Owners of luxury housing near open spaces contribute to conservation
in three different ways. First, because the value of their property de
pends on the continuous existence of the park, the owners of realty
abutting the park will do everything in their power to arrest harmful
development. Second, the higher value of the property near parks
translates into higher tax payments that are used, in part, to maintain
the parks. Third, and finally, studies reveal that owners of luxury
housing near parks donate disproportionately to the maintenance of
the parks.221 Thus, we submit that the development of luxury housing
on the fringes of parks and open spaces is an important key for stable
conservation with desirable distributive effects.
As we show in Part V.B below, private conservation mechanisms
clearly outperform public schemes in ensuring cost-effective conserva
tion. Our proposal not only reduces enforcement and monitoring costs
that would otherwise be borne by the public at large; it also makes the
beneficiaries of antiproperty easements responsible for those reduced
costs. The recipients of the public largesse are thus also the bearers of
the public responsibility. All segments of the public (other than ineffi
cient developers) should therefore expect to gain.222
2.

Dynamic Effects

By stabilizing green spaces, antiproperty mechanisms can enhance
the positive dynamics that lead homeowners to seek the efficient con
servation of parks and nature preserves. Generally, property owners
seek to discourage the nearby location of properties that produce
negative externalities, while encouraging the location of properties
that produce positive externalities. This natural tendency is responsi
ble for the much remarked-upon NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard)
phenomenon, in which homeowners acknowledge the social utility of a
particular land use but combat its nearby location because of localized
negative externalities.223 The positive externalities created by green

221 . In 2000, for example, wealthy nearby neighbors donated $19 million to Central
Park. Barbara Stewart, Central Park-Like Rebirth ls Sought for Other Parks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2001, at Bl. This may be explained by the special "endowment effect" such property
owners share with respect to the park. See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193 (1991).
222. As we show in Part IV, supra, flexibility can be added to antiproperty mechanisms
to reduce the burden on developers as well.
223. See supra note 25. NIMBY, it turns out, belongs to the family of property acronyms
known as LULU ("Locally Undesirable Land Use"). See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note
14, at 1063 & n.32; cf Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice
and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993).
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spaces can create the opposite YIMBY (Yes In My Back Yard) phe
nomenon, in which property owners will seek the nearby location of
the socially beneficial land uses. Antiproperty easements enhance this
trend by providing the inverse of a nuisance suit. Nuisance permits
proximate-property owners to counteract negative externalities
affecting the enjoyment of their property. Antiproperty easements, on
the other hand, permit nearby neighbors to bring enforcement actions
to preserve positive externalities benefiting their property. The
enhanced YIMBY effect promoted by antiproperty easements should,
in turn, increase the ex ante incentive to seek local development of
parks and green spaces.
B.

Policy A lternatives

In this Section, we examine the possible policy alternatives to an
antiproperty regime, focusing on the public-trust doctrine, expanded
environmental-standing doctrines, and the use of conservation ease
ments. While we determine that each tool has its use in a scheme of
conservation, none provides a complete alternative to the use of anti
property.
1.

Public Trust

The public-trust doctrine holds that "some resources, particularly
lands beneath navigable waters or washed by the tides, are either in
herently the property of the public at large, or are at least subject to a
kind of inherent easement for certain public purposes."224 In an influ
ential article in 1970, Joseph Sax argued for the expansion of the
public-trust doctrine in order to more effectively protect natural
resources.225 Sax argued both for a revival of the largely dormant doc
trine, and for the inclusion of a wide array of environmental goods (in
addition to the traditional water-related resources) in the scope of the
doctrine.226 Sax hoped that the public-trust doctrine would become a
tool for courts to engage in more probing judicial review of state ac
tions that adversely impacted publicly and privately owned environ
mental resources.227 In Sax's formulation, a court should "look with
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is cal-

224. Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 ,
3 5 1 (1998).
225. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judi
cial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
226. Id.
227. Id.
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culated either to reallocate that resource to more restrictive uses or to
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties. "228
Sax intended the public-trust doctrine to produce a trust dynamic
similar to that sought by antiproperty easements. Faced with distor
tions in the market and a political arena inimical to conservation, Sax
sought to appoint a set of guardians to watch over the underprotected
environmental concerns.
Yet, notwithstanding courts' sporadic use of the public-trust doc
trine to strike down measures perceived as environmentally
unfriendly, Sax's efforts fell short of his stated goal.229 Courts have
proved reluctant to accept the mantle Sax wished to bestow upon
them, and even where they have, they have not necessarily reached
the j udgments that Sax would prefer.230 In our analysis, the chief fail
ing of Sax's proposal is its failure to take into account the incentives of
the chosen trustees and the vices of the institutional actors on whom
his proposal so critically depends.
In the public-trust doctrine, the government is expected to see it
self as a trustee of certain natural resources for the benefit of the pub
lic, and the courts are expected to enforce the fiduciary relationship.
Yet it is precisely the failings in governmental decisionmaking that led
to Sax's proposal, and one could hardly expect the political process to
change because of the invocation of the magic words "public trust."
The courts, therefore, must play a crucial role in forcing the govern
ment to fulfill its duties, but the courts have very little incentive to do
so. Determining the efficient use of natural resources is a time
consuming and information-intensive endeavor of the kind that courts
are ill-equipped to conduct.231 Moreover, even if courts were equipped
to handle the task, it cannot be taken for granted that they would
arrive at the conclusions desired by Sax. Judges of different back
grounds and viewpoints value natural resources differently, and one
would expect that some jurisdictions would block too much develop-

228. Id. at 490 (emphasis removed).
229. See Sax, supra note 225 (citing cases using the public-trust doctrine for environ
mental issues); Sharon M. Kelly, Note, The Public Trust and the Constitution: Routes to Judi
cial Overview ofResource Management Decisions in Virginia, 75 VA. L. REV. 895, 912 (1989)
(describing courts' ability to use the public-trust doctrine to require environmental impact
studies).

230. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natu
ral Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986) (reviewing
successes and failures). See also Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of
Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on
the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209 (1991 ).
231. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1306 (1982) ("[C]ourts lack the capacity to gather and analyze data
that are needed to gauge the economic benefits of increased regulatory protection.").
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ment, while others would block too little.232 Instead of ensuring opti
mal development, the public-trust doctrine could bring about too
much and too little conservation, depending on the jurisdiction.
By contrast, our antiproperty mechanism avoids this central pitfall.
Our trustees, the antiproperty easement holders, have a pecuniary
incentive in conservation since the values of their properties depend
on the continued existence of parks and green spaces. Additionally,
due to their immediate proximity to the conserved area, the nearby
neighbors are uniquely positioned to monitor its use and acquire in
formation cheaply. Yet, in our system, the trustees' role is mostly pas
sive. Conservation commons can be preserved (or disbanded in the
case of takings) without any significant action on the part of the ease
ment holders. Indeed, the holdout dynamic generated by the ease
ments locks the easement holders into their roles as trustees.
An even more important virtue of our proposal is its reliance on a
predominantly private market mechanism for achieving conservation.
The reduced public role in enforcement of conservation lowers costs
and eliminates the agency problem that plagues public enforcement
schemes. The ideological disposition of the easement holders is irrele
vant, as is that of the developers. Moreover, no bribes or other finan
cial incentives are likely to undermine the conservation-commons
regime. Finally, absent naked trespass (a highly unlikely occurrence),
there is virtually no need for enforcement, greatly reducing the cost of
oversight.
2.

Environmental Standing

Similar observations may be made concerning proposals for special
standing doctrines in environmental litigation. Periodically, proposals
have been made to relax the requirement of standing in order to allow
more litigants into court to plead for environmental protection,
notwithstanding their lack of a traditional connection to the legal
claim.233 The most extreme and intriguing of these suggestions was
made by Christopher Stone, who proposed granting standing to in232. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155
(1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1717 (1997) (describing an empirical study finding that ideology plays an important
role in judicial decisionmaking in the D.C. Circuit).
233. See, e.g. , Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-55 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent
ing); Joseph L. Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision, 13 Nat.
Resources J. 76 (1973); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries, " and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1992) (arguing for creating a
bounty for environmental claimants, in order to provide the injury-in-fact necessary to es
tablish standing); cf United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (allowing students attenuated standing for an environmental
claim).
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animate natural objects in order to defend themselves in court.234 The
efforts to relax standing should be seen as the procedural counterparts
to Sax's suggestions regarding the public-trust doctrine. Both sets of
claims aim at expanding the courts' role in overseeing environmental
protection: the public-trust doctrine by adding to the menu of substan
tive claims that can be brought by environmentalist litigants, and envi
ronmental standing doctrines by eliminating procedural barriers.
Nominally, each targets a different set of trustees - j udges or envi
ronmentalists - but, in fact, both require both sets of trustees in order
to achieve their goals.
Unfortunately, expanded environmental standing, if granted,
would likely not overcome the shortcomings of the public-trust doc
trine. Environmentalists' increased access to courts would not guaran
tee the solicitousness of the judges or their ability to oversee the com
plex information-gathering process that would have to accompany
their determination of the issues. Nor would environmental standing
doctrines bring preservation of conservation commons out of the
public arena. Unlike Sax, who called for the creation a new substan
tive cause of action, champions of expanded environmental standing
only seek to clear a procedural hurdle, while relying on traditional
claims under administrative law for substance. Yet, absent a new sub
stantive cause of action, such as Sax's public-trust doctrine, it is un
clear that environmental litigants would fare well in court.
While we do not doubt the genuine commitment of environmental
groups to conservation, budget constraints, high monitoring costs, and
the reliance on litigation as an enforcement mechanism may combine
to prevent these groups from achieving their professed goals.
3.

Conservation Easements

A conservation easement is "a negative restriction on land which
prohibits a landowner from using her land in a manner that will
change the ecological, scenic, open or natural state of the land."235
Conservation easements are widely recognized in state law,236 and are

234. Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natu
ral Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
235. Kimberly K. Winter, Comment, The Endangered Species Act Under A ttack: Could
Conservation Easements Help Save the ESA?, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 371, 385 (1993) (foot
note omitted).
236. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.17.010-34.17.060 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 33-271 to -276 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-20-401 to -410 (Michie 2000) ; CAL.
Crv. CODE §§ 815-816 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -1 1 1 (2002); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7-13lb-d (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2601 to -2605 (2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 704.06 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-10-1 to -8 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 198-1 to -6 (Michie 1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2101 to -2109 (Michie 2003); 505 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/2-1 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-23-5-1 to -8 (West 2002); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 457A.1-457A.8 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3803 to -3809 (1991);
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generally created by private agreement between owners of the green
space and government agencies or private conservation organizations
that purchase the conservation easements. Conservation easements
protect the designated property in perpetuity, though they usually may
be discharged by circumstances that make it impossible for the prop
erty to continue to meet its intended purpose.
Conceptually, our antiproperty easements differ in three important
respects from ordinary conservation easements. First, with conserva
tion easements, private property owners generally cede non
possessory rights in privately owned green spaces to public (e.g., gov
ernment agency) or quasi-public (e.g., an environmental group)
organizations.237 Our antiproperty easements move in the other direc
tion: the government grants the easement to private property owners,
thereby divesting itself from one of the sticks in its bundle of property
rights. Second, and relatedly, usually there is but one conservation
easement per green space. Numerous antiproperty easements are cre
ated for each space and ownership in them is widely dispersed. As we
explained earlier, the dispersal of easements is critical to creating an
antiproperty regime that enhances conservation. Third, conservation
easements are generally thought to be immutable and perpetual. Ab
sent the most extraordinary circumstances, conservation easements
are expected not to be transferred; they protect the property in its
pristine state forever. Antiproperty easements, however, when com
bined with takings regimes, or when protected by pliable protection,
may be dissolved in order to permit efficient development.
These differences notwithstanding, conservation easements and
antiproperty easements may share certain characteristics. To the ex
tent that conservation easements are granted to environmental groups
(as opposed to the government), both mechanisms shift enforcement

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382.800-382.990 (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:12719:1276 (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 476 to -479-B (West 1966); MD. CODE
ANN. REAL PROP. § 2-118 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West 2002);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.2140-324.2144 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84C.Ol84C.05 (West 1 995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-19-1 to -15 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 67.87067.910 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-201 to -211 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1 1 1 .390-1 1 1 .440 (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 477:45-477:47 (2001); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13:8B-1 to -9 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-12-1 to -6 (Michie 1 978); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 49-0301 to -0311 (McKinney 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
5301.67-5301 .99 (Anderson 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 271.715-271.795 (2001); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 3, §§ 914.1-914.2 (West 1995); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5 (1995); s.c. CODE
ANN. §§ 27-8-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1 976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 1 1 -13-101 to -117,
66-9-301 to -309 (1999); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 183.001-183.005 (Vernon Supp.
2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-18-1 to -7 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1009 to -1016 (Mi
chie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.130 (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
61.34(3m), 700.40 (West 2001).
237. Julia D . Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88
VA. L. REV. 739, 741-42 (2002).
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of conservation from public to private entities.238 Even then, however,
conservation easements suffer from two disadvantages. First, since the
grantees of the easement do not have immediate access to the
protected resource, monitoring is substantially more costly. Second,
conservation easements are much less appealing politically. Antiprop
erty easements should appeal to politicians because they benefit voters
who are likely to be among their constituents. The beneficiaries of an
tiproperty schemes are all local voters, who are likely to repay politi
cians who bestow benefits on them. Conservation easements, on the
other hand, do not offer a similar quid pro quo. The beneficiaries of
conservation easements are often nonlocal actors, and benefiting them
is unlikely to yield meaningful returns to local politicians who deter
mine land use policy. Thus, from a pragmatic standpoint, antiproperty
easements are a preferable policy tool.
This is not to say, however, that conservation easements are with
out merit. On the contrary, they are a necessary complement to anti
property easements. Insofar as conservation of wilderness is con
cerned, conservation easements are the better policy tool. In such
cases, there are often no neighbors in whom antiproperty easements
can vest, and decisions about conservation of such resources are made
at the national level.239 Additionally, conservation easements may be
an important component of a combined antiproperty-takings regime.
As we noted earlier,240 conservation easements may be used to account
for the value of public use of a park not captured in the value of the
antiproperty easements.
4.

Summary

We summarize our discussion of the policy tools for conservation
in the following table.

238. See also Thompson, supra note 29.
239. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41
(1997) (describing the federal wilderness system as an "important conservation asset") . But
see John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 564-66 (1996) (calculating that thirty-three million wilderness acres are protected
by preservationist owners) .
240. See supra Section IV.C.
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Two factors strongly emerge from the tabular comparison of the
policy alternatives.
First, the antiproperty easement mechanism possesses a clear cost
advantage over its competitors, especially those based upon encour
aging environmental litigation. Antiproperty easements create a struc
ture that preserves green space with low monitoring and enforcement
expenses, due primarily to the employment of "trustees" who are posi-
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tioned to oversee the condition of the protected space and are also
highly motivated to do so. While some of the participants in mecha
nisms employing public trust or expanded environmental standing
have a strong ideological motivation for protecting the natural asset,
others (i.e., the courts) may lack that commitment. In any event, nei
ther the courts nor the litigants enjoy the easy monitoring of nearby
neighbors in possession of antiproperty easements. Where conserva
tion easements are vested in conservation organizations, the "trustees"
will possess a strong motivation to carry out their duties, but they too
will not be as well positioned as nearby neighbors.
Second, the cost advantages of antiproperty easements will not be
present in those cases where there is not a ready group of nearby
neighbors, as in the case of a large and remote wilderness area. In such
cases, conservation easements may be a preferred option.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we introduced the concept of antiproperty ease
ments - a private conservation mechanism that allows only socially
desirable development.241 En route to this mechanism, we surveyed
the political and market institutions affecting conservation, and drew
on the salient strengths and weaknesses of both institutions to ensure
the preservation of conservation commons. We also compared our an
tiproperty mechanism to other theoretical and doctrinal solutions to
the conservation challenge and elucidated the conditions under which
our mechanism is superior to the alternatives.
Theoretically, we demonstrated that when transaction costs sys
tematically bias the market in favor of a particular interest, the best
policy response may be to grant the initial entitlement to the opposing
interest and create additional transaction costs, thereby making the
entitlement inalienable. An intriguing implication of this counter
intuitive insight is that anticommons regimes - currently viewed as
"tragic" - are actually beneficial when conservation is the social goal.
Furthermore, we showed how the interplay between market and po
litical institutions may engender a superior equilibrium to those cre
ated by each institution alone. We demonstrated that while the politi
cal process would lead to too little conservation, and the market to too
much conservation, the combination of private antiproperty ease
ments with a carefully designed takings law may lead to the optimal
balance between conservation and development.
The practical implications of the Article are quite straightforward.
It is imperative to develop an effective conservation tool that would
241 . As explained in our introduction, our proposal is intended to apply in the context
of communities that have already identified conservation as the socially desirable use for
their commons.
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arrest inefficient development. We submit that our antiproperty ease
ments are a necessary weapon in the conservationist arsenal.

